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 This thesis seeks to contribute to the scholarship on this underdeveloped topic of 
how religion, minority identity, and issues of integration intersect by evaluating the 
questions of a) whether religion significantly fosters identity within minority groups, b) 
whether religious communities linked with specific minority groups help or hinder 
integration, and c) what level of importance religion has in the interplay of minority 
identity and loyalty to the state where a minority has long resided or claims citizenship. The 
case study of Estonia was chosen. Its large Russian minority, history as a former Soviet 
republic, and proximity to Russia make it a fitting choice for this topic, as does its religious 
landscape which provides an interesting field for examination. Home to two Orthodox 
churches (the Estonian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate and the Estonian Apostolic 
Orthodox Church) under two competing patriarchates (Moscow Patriarchate and 
Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople), the churches have the potential to be 
alternative platforms through which ethnic-specific concerns and views are expressed and 
embodied.  
 In order to answer the key questions of this study, statistical sources have been 
analyzed, providing a quantitative picture of both the minority and the religious 
composition of Estonia. Those numbers were enlivened with a qualitative look at minority 
issues, national historical narratives, and religious community relationships that still 
contribute greatly to the dialogue in Estonia today. Interviews with Estonian clergy, 
academics, nonprofit leaders, and government employees form a significant part of this 
research and are an important element of its contribution to current scholarly debates. 
Through this variety of research and sources, I argue that Estonia, even in light of its 
nonreligious reputation, does contain Orthodox religious communities that effect minority 
identity, both in terms of active members and those who purely claim to be Orthodox. The 
Orthodox churches provide a connection to ethnic and national loyalties and identities, 
inevitably becoming politically charged and thus making the churches occasional 
participants in the debates of large minority issues, especially those that implicate the 
involvement of the neighboring Russian Federation. Religion is effected in both escalating 
and deescalating political tensions. Churches, especially the Orthodox communities of 
Estonia, have the potential to be leaders in resolution, compromise, and cooperation among 
Estonians and Russians, but must be cultivated as such or risk being case into the role of 
entities of future division. 
 
Keywords: Orthodoxy, Estonia, Russia, Russian Orthodox Church, Estonian Apostolic 
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Introduction 
 
 With the dissolution of the Soviet Union came the rebirth of sovereign Central and 
Eastern European states, as well as the reemergence of various institutions and freedoms 
that had once been forbidden by the state. From within this new openness afforded by 
independence grew conceptualizations of national identity that had formerly been silenced 
under the facade of Soviet brotherhood. Oftentimes, these identities expressed their 
newfound voices through the recently manifested political avenues. These voices did not 
only belong to the titular national cultures of these now independent states. Rather, these 
new states came saddled with their own identity issues, minority populations, and the 
unfamiliar challenge of accounting for and guiding all citizens along a unified path of 
constitutional democratic development.  
 National and ethnic identity has remained at the forefront of the political discourse, 
especially regarding minority groups. Its importance in the political sphere rests on its role 
as a primary element in determining and implementing effective integration policy. It is 
thus important to understand the ways in which minority groups cultivate and preserve their 
identities; this can lead to increasingly well-informed integration policy as well as a greater 
understanding of minority groups’ acceptance of or opposition to attempts to integrate them 
into the larger polity and society.  
One of these former republics, Estonia, boasts a sizeable ethnic Russian minority, a 
quarter of its total population of approximately 1.3 million.1 Since regaining their 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the Estonian state has addressed this 
population explicitly through various avenues. Chiefly, Estonia’s main strategy in terms of 
minority integration has centered on language. Stemming from the key concern of 
increasing Estonian fluency among the Russian-speaking population, the major debates 
regarding minority policy have targeted the importance of language in education, media, 
and meeting citizenship requirements. These areas are the main stages on which Estonian 
and Russian interests and individuals collide, naturally provoking a conflict as each group 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Statistics Estonia, http://www.stat.ee/population-census 
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aims to strengthen or preserve their identities within a shared Estonian state. However, 
there remains one key point of intersection between these two groups that remains 
relatively under-examined and that is religion. 
 Religion is simultaneously one of the world’s most divisive and unifying markers of 
identity. Particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, religion took on a curious, dynamic 
role after the collapse of a communist system that peddled widespread atheism. Faithful of 
all different denominations and creeds were now free to practice and preach, bringing a 
new set of labels, feelings, and associations to the table. In more recent studies studies of 
minority group identity, the focus has shifted more towards Middle Eastern or Asian 
groups, either within countries of that region or as migrants to other western nations.2 In 
these investigations religion is often a key factor, as these regions remain rife with ethnic 
and religious conflict. Yet regarding the former republics of the Soviet Union, little has 
been explored in which religion and minority status are intertwined. Katja Richters, in her 
book, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture and Greater Russia, 
does provide case studies of three such countries—Belarus, Ukraine, and Estonia—and 
their relationships with the Russian Orthodox Church. Her ultimate goal is to see “how 
independent the Church [the Russian Orthodox Church] is of the Kremlin” through 
examination of their political culture and the political culture surrounding the churches in 
the previously mentioned case study countries.3 Richters provides one of the few detailed 
and primarily religion-oriented looks at Estonia, but does so with a concentration on the 
Russian Orthodox leadership in Moscow, the balance of power between it and the Kremlin, 
and the way these relationships are expressed and echoed through Estonian religious 
affairs. The religious revival and political maneuvering of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Maya Shatzmiller, ed. Studies in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Nationalism and Minority Identities in 
Islamic Societies. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005. Modern-day press and politics, like the 
growing Muslim population in the UK (and the country’s political reaction) and France’s laws against 
religious paraphernalia all add to the ongoing public dialogue on this issue, typically centered around 
religions that are generally viewed as not being traditionally/historically European. 	  3	  Katja Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture and Greater Russia, (New 
York: Routledge, 2013), 15.	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Russia is the main focus of her study; minority issues, identity, and the role of integration 
receive little attention.4  This thesis looks primarily to these areas instead. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to look at the question of whether religion creates a 
space in which a minority community can foster its identity and further goals specific to 
that minority and closely tied with the identity that they choose to express. To clarify, while 
this study expects to find whether religion creates this space, it is not presumed that 
something of a non-religious nature is not capable of doing the same thing, nor that it 
cannot do so in tandem with religion. In pursuing this larger goal, it was important to 
determine a relevant case study for this research. Estonia provides a fitting choice as its 
minority population and the conflicts and issues that come with it have found themselves at 
the forefront of Estonian politics and public debate. Though Estonia identifies itself as one 
of the most nonreligious countries in the world, its religious communities have already 
been influenced by and pulled into the dialogue and disputes between Estonians and 
Russians.5 Russians are typically assumed to be Russian Orthodox, a Christian 
denomination often referred to as synonymous with calling oneself Russian. Within 
Estonia, the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is not the sole 
Orthodox Church, but begrudgingly shares this canonical territory with the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate’s Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church. Therefore, the choice of this case 
study is grounded not only in issues of minority politics, but also in the unique and 
ethnically significant religious communities that call Estonia home.  
The general problems that were initially raised in the formulation of this study were 
a) to determine whether religion fosters identity within minority groups in a significant 
way, b) to analyze whether religious communities linked with minority groups help or 
hinder their integration into society as desired by the state, and c) ultimately to access the 
level of importance religion has in the overarching conversation of melding minority 
identity with civic loyalty to the state. While these questions helped to guide research and 
organization, additional and more case-specific questions were formulated as well. Is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Ibid, 8. 	  5	  Ringo Ringvee, “Is Estonia really the least religious country in the world?,” The Guardian, September 16, 
2011, accessed August 25, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/sep/16/estonia-
least-religious-country-world.	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Estonian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate perpetuating the Russian Orthodox 
Church’s fixation on maintaining strong regional ties and influence by forestalling 
integrative measures? Do the two Orthodox churches in Estonia primarily serve as markers 
of ethnic identity rather than an adherence to faith or doctrine? And ultimately, what are the 
key issues and areas of disagreement between these churches and how are they reflected in 
the dialogue on minority issues and vice versa?   
 This thesis is divided into four parts. The first section will provide a theoretical 
background for understanding how this complicated intersection of religion and minority 
identity has been viewed thus far and how it will be defined and interpreted through this 
particular study. As the specific relationship between Estonia’s Orthodox churches and the 
Russian minority remains a largely unexamined topic, prominent themes from the body of 
scholarly literature on nationalism, religion, and minority identification will be identified 
here. These sources and the theories and ways of thinking that they contribute form a 
foundation on which to discuss the more recent findings of Estonia’s case and the original 
interviews conducted for this thesis. The second section will present the historical analysis, 
not only of Estonia’s post-Soviet independent statehood and the minority issues that 
followed, but relationships between the two Orthodox churches and the political links they 
have fostered. The third section will focus on the analysis and extrapolation of statistical 
data in conjunction with the information gleaned from interviews, in order to create a fuller 
picture of identity and religion within Estonia’s ethnic Russian minority. The fourth and 
final section will put forth the final conclusions of this thesis and look forward to how 
recent events within the European continent could impact Estonia and its Orthodox 
communities in the future.  
 Ultimately, this thesis, though focusing on a specific case study in Eastern Europe, 
has the potential to provide a greater understanding of how minorities can maintain and 
strengthen ties with a mother country through religion. It also may reveal whether faith has 
the power to link minorities to an element of their culture in such a way that it provides a 
stronger bond with their former or ancestral homeland over that of their country of 
residence. An understanding of religion’s place in minority identity and community-
building helps push the borders of transnational thinking, a vital necessity in an 
	   10	  
increasingly globalized world. As Peggy Levitt points out, understanding the ways in 
which foreign-born nationals, immigrants, or non-native speakers claim their faith 
traditions and communities can oftentimes lead to a greater understanding of the way and 
intensity with which they claim a national identity. Today’s churches play a different role 
than they once did when it comes to incorporating minority members into society.6 They 
have the potential to both cultivate cultural preservation while also isolating members or 
raising the suspicions of those outside of its community. Their influence and the 
reverberations of their actions can also be felt beyond the nation’s physical borders, not 
only affected by politics, but in turn influencing them as well. In navigating this complex 
terrain, Levitt states that political overlap is inevitable. This thesis moves forward in 
agreement with this belief.  Therefore, the questions and findings of this thesis have the 
capacity to not only illuminate this specific Estonian situation, but to speak to larger 
international religious and political themes and church-state dynamics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Peggy Levitt, “Redefining the Boundaries of Belonging: The Transnationalization of Religious Life,” in 
Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives, ed. Nancy T. Ammerman (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 103-120.	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1. Theoretical Framework 
Identity and religion are concepts often hard to define. The words themselves are 
subject to numerous definitions. Additionally, this specific case study of Estonia is unique, 
as it brings together elements, such as nationalism, religious belief and fervor, borders, 
minorities, and ethnic heritage, which are typically studied separately or with minimal 
comparison. Therefore, this section will introduce the theories and studies that are 
important for the context of this thesis, providing a clearer look at the foundation on which 
identity and religion are understood and how they will be employed or referenced 
throughout the following text. The subsections of this chapter explore first the issues of the 
nation, looking at Rogers Brubaker’s influential reordering of the concept of nationalism 
and the nation and how shifting our perception of these two elements changes how we see 
borders and cross-cultural influences. Second, the ways in which religion and nation tie 
together are explored, beginning with a look at the more basic, common footing that 
nationalism and religion share, before expanding into the role of religion as an archive of 
lineage and continuity which can be used as a tool for nationalistic aims. Finally, the 
sociological role of religion and impactful literature on that subject are discussed, primarily 
centering on the theme of religion’s persistent nature and the nature of its adherence today. 
  
1.1 Minority Identity Within the Nation State  
The considerably large Russian population within Estonia finds itself in close proximity 
to a land that many would recognize as a mother-state. Though Russian-speakers within 
Estonia are not always ethnically Russian, nor may they have been born in Russia proper, 
their link to a country that speaks the second most popular language in Estonia, is right 
across the border, and once called Estonia part of its territory factors prominently into 
Estonian state considerations and policy. Understanding links to a nation or nationalism 
that exists beyond the confines of an actual border is necessary in this instance. Rogers 
Brubaker’s Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New 
Europe, looks at this very issue, pointing to the Soviet Union’s dissolution specifically as 
one of his argument’s key examples where a typical understanding of nationhood, 
nationalism, and the national question is challenged.  
	   12	  
Brubaker acknowledges that the formation of states around the “principle of 
nationality” was a formative shift conducted by numerous states in the wake of the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, a purposeful secession from the multinational superpower that it had 
once been.7 Estonia is a fitting example of this development, as the independent post-Soviet 
state was and continues to be understood as distinctly Estonian, a point particularly 
expressed through the official state language, though equal rights and protection are 
afforded to other ethnic minorities in Estonia’s constitution.8 Growing alongside these 
nations that are actively “nationalizing” are what Brubaker terms “external national 
homelands,” nations whose nationalisms are assertive by nature, actively seeking to oppose 
or compete for claims over people.9 Typically, these homeland perspectives grow from 
defeat or dissolution, their sentiments a result of loss of status and space that hurts the 
nation’s power, influence, prestige, and economic and political impact. They assert 
themselves as this “external national homeland” when they begin to view residents of 
neighboring countries as their co-nationals and claim a responsibility for them, regardless 
of the borders that separate them.10 Russia’s approach towards Russian nationals abroad 
conforms remarkably well to Brubaker’s classification, as evidenced in the official Concept 
of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.11  Estonia, as an immediate neighbor and 
home to a significant Russian minority, fulfills the criteria to warrant Russia’s politically 
watchful eye.  
Brubaker’s text posits that “nation” is something that is practiced rather than 
territorially institutionalized.12 Nationness13 lies with the people, rather than the territory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3. 
8 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, chp. I, §6. 
9 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, 5. 
10 Ibid, 5.  
11 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Section 3, 39 d) and e) 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D 
Konstantin Kosachev, “Russia must defend interests of compatriots abroad,” Valdai, March 3, 2013, accessed 
October 20, 2013, http://valdaiclub.com/politics/56220.html. 
12 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe, 21. 
13 Brubaker uses the term “nationness” as an instigator for thinking about the word “nation” differently. 
Essentially the two words are meant to be the same, but he employs “nationness” to stress the nation’s role 
“as practical category, institutionalized form, and contingent event. ‘Nation’ is a category of practice, not (in 
the first instance) a category of analysis” (7). I use the term in the same way as Brubaker in this thesis, 
	   13	  
though this is often confused. In fact, the Soviet Union’s republics and autonomous regions 
contributed to this confusion, classifying territories based on the ethnic descent of its 
inhabitants. However, in generating these categories of social identification, the Soviets 
simultaneously failed to create a link between that ethnic label and citizenship, as the 
USSR was a self-professed multi-national union.14 This link between territory and ethnic 
identity helped to pave the way for countries such as Estonia to break from the 
conglomeration that was the Soviet Union into smaller, more ethnically homogenous states. 
Yet, having used such methods to secure their independence, the element of an ever-
evolving nationness that Brubaker encourages is lost in today’s discussions of transnational 
relations. Rather, it appears that territorial and cultural boundaries must align, while 
Brubaker challenges society to think of nationalism without nations, and of “national 
autonomy…not [as] the convergence of territorial administration and national culture, but 
their independence.”15  
Brubaker correctly predicted that nationalizing states would continue to have tense 
relationships with new minority groups within their borders and the states beyond their 
borders that these groups acknowledged as external homelands. His predictions also ring 
true in the case of Estonia when he states that successor states will see newly defined 
Russian enclaves develop within their national borders, an almost compensational 
occurrence considering the loss of territory with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. At the 
point of publication, Nationalism Reframed did not have the distance from the construction 
of new states that would have been necessary to predict how the former Soviet republics 
would deal with the portions of their citizenry that were becoming members of a new 
Russian minority, nor how that minority would react to its new status. Nevertheless, 
Brubaker’s work in redefining and contextualizing nationalism and nationness with modern 
historical examples remains pertinent to this thesis. Not only have many of his predictions 
been particularly applicable to Estonia’s case, but also the questions that he poses and was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
subscribing to his call to change the thinking surrounding the concept of nation from an established entity, “a 
real group,” through which we evaluate participants and events to that of a changing concept that they act on 
and through, inviting change.  
14 Ibid, 23 
15 Ibid, 40.  
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unable to answer at the time of his writing remain relevant to the concerns of this thesis. 
His curiosity as to how minority Russians will identify themselves—as an entirely separate 
nationality or along lines of language and culture—and in what ways Russia itself will 
choose to effect or influence the extent of the minority’s resoluteness in setting themselves 
apart will be explored in this study.16  
 
1.2 The intersection of nation and religion 
One cannot read Brubaker and employ his notion of “nationalization of political space” 
without engaging Benedict Anderson’s classic work, Imagined Communities. The concepts 
that Anderson puts forth are famous in the study of nationalism, and for the purposes of this 
thesis, serve to begin bridging the gap between the foci of nation and faith. From the 
beginning, Anderson compares the strength of nationalist imaginings with that of religious 
fervor. Just as one belongs to a nation, whose bounds and population stretches beyond 
one’s capability to understand, a similar phenomenon can be used to explain faith 
communities. Anderson references religions as the propagators of sacred speech, the 
institutions from which the pinnacles of thought, theology and culture stemmed.17 In this 
sense, they preceded the imagined, limited, and sovereign nation that is at the root of 
nationalism, a concept that Anderson and Brubaker alike argue is not fading away as many 
initially thought it would at the end of the twentieth century. Although Anderson looks to 
cultural roots for their role in the transition from a world that favors religion to a world that 
presently leans more on nationalism, religion remains important to how groups can and 
have contextualized their own identities in society. Understanding nationalism goes hand-
in-hand with understanding religion in that the latter is one of the “large cultural systems 
that preceded it, out of which…it came into being.”18  Religion has offered human beings a 
way in which to understand the world around them, their place in it, and a means to make 
sense of their own suffering and the inevitable pitfalls of human existence. It centers man 
along a line of time that is unimaginably long, yet comfortingly familiar. It is this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Ibid, 48, 53.  
17 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1991), 13. 
18 Ibid, 12. 	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“language of continuity” and overarching connectedness that Anderson claims religion and 
the nation share as imagined communities.19  
This same cross-over between religion and the nation is expertly illustrated in 
Katherine Verdery’s work, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist 
Change, in which she covers the unique subject of reclaiming and relocating historically 
and culturally significant human remains, particularly in post-communist Romania, 
Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Echoing Brubaker’s proposal that the Soviet Union’s internal 
administrative structure based on republics and autonomous regions incidentally furthered 
ethnic identification, Verdery places her understanding of national identity and the 
relationships it fosters within the context of kinship construction.20 In kinship 
construction—recognizing or referring to oneself as a child of a motherland for example—
Verdery consequently locates nationalism as a variant of “ancestor worship,” thus 
following Anderson’s lead of linking strong national identification with attributes of 
religious affiliation that are almost pagan in their seemingly ancient nature. The bodies that 
are used as catalysts for burgeoning nationalist movements in successor states were seen as 
quintessential family members within the “national genealogy,” physical relics that are of 
the utmost importance to groups hungry to project and defend a more recently developed or 
outnumbered identity.21   
In focusing on the physical ownership and placement of human remains, Verdery 
shows how tangible items of cultural significance and heritage become politically charged 
and exponentially valuable. Reflections of this reality can be seen in Estonia’s case and will 
be mentioned further, especially in references from interviewees regarding the present day 
dynamic and persisting tension over property disputes between the Estonian Apostolic 
Orthodox Church (EAOC) and the Estonian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (EOC-
MP). Verdery writes of a similar problem regarding the Orthodox Church in Romania, a 
Church that found itself competing with Greek Catholics for property, government funding, 
and public recognition, many of the same struggles that other Orthodox congregations have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid, 11.  
20 Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), 41.  
21 Ibid. 	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cited in the wake of socialism’s collapse in various Central and Eastern European states. 
The desire for a restoration of popular legitimacy has been a prime motivation for the 
Orthodox Church’s actions following communism’s collapse and is not restricted to 
Verdery’s case studies alone.22 The potential for a certain denomination or religion to be 
equated fully and synonymously with a nationality and the patriotic influence that the 
church is able to exert upon individuals is a fascinating phenomenon that is certainly alive 
and well today. Verdery’s examples of such cases show the ways in which church 
communities can animate themselves politically under the guise of faith, furthering ethnic-
specific agendas as part of the process of nationalization.23 The use of a common heritage’s 
physical emblems that become unexpectedly and highly charged and the furthering of the 
intersection of religion and nationalist politics as discussed in Verdery’s work both directly 
influence the analysis to be made later on in this thesis.   
 
1.3 Sociological theory on religion  
While Anderson believes that, though influential on the foundational level, religion has 
been superseded by nationalism, Daniele Hervieu-Leger’s Religion as a Chain of Memory 
points towards religion’s resiliency, an argument that this thesis supports. Though her focus 
does not center on states or nationalism, her work on memory and its continuation through 
religious traditions speaks to religion’s important role in validating and reengaging people 
culturally. A significant portion of her book is spent attempting to define religion and the 
ultimate definition that she arrives at is a helpful one in terms of this study. Once again, she 
harkens to religion’s principal characteristic of continuity, saying that “religion is an 
ideological, practical, and symbolic system through which consciousness, both individual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid, 72.  
23 Ibid, 84. Katherine Verdery includes a long quotation from the speech of a monk who regards loyalty to the 
Orthodox religion as tantamount to one’s Romanianess. “If you want to be a true son of Christ and of 
Romania, hold to the righteous faith, Orthodoxy…if not, you are no son of Christ or of the Church, and you 
are alien to the Romanian nation.”  His words illustrate the way in which the Orthodox Church can be used as 
an ethnic and religious identity marker. In this example, he spoke effectively against incoming protestant 
missionaries who were subsequently not of Romanian origins and also of the strong patriotic identity present 
in the people at that time. It’s worth noting that similar arguments have been used in Russia as well. Also, the 
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into the faith communities of the majority or titular nationality. 	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and collective, of belonging to a particular chain of belief is constituted, maintained, 
developed and controlled.”24 Therefore, religion legitimizes not only the faith-based beliefs 
and traditions, but the identity of those who call themselves members as well. This 
identification is dually calibrated—locating the individual within the community and 
locating the community apart from those who are different.25  
Hervieu-Leger’s text is rich with deep sociological insights, but the greatest 
contribution gleaned from her work for the sake of this thesis is that of the connection 
between memory and religion. Noting that the structure of our memories have morphed 
over time from one shared memory into the categorized memories that we now possess, 
bearing labels such as national, religious, or familial memories, Hervieu-Leger points to the 
importance of anamnesis, “the recalling to memory of the past…often observed as a rite” as 
central to the continued lineage of religious identity and practice.26 Any witness to or 
participant in an Orthodox liturgy would undoubtedly agree that the practice of anamnesis 
is alive and well within the walls of these churches and cathedrals. A full sensory 
experience, its sounds, smells, and sights have been praised for their evocativeness, calling 
believers back thousands of years while simultaneously casting them forward, as the liturgy 
has remained and will continue to the remain the same for ages. The chain of memory that 
Hervieu-Leger has highlighted in her title is embodied in the Orthodox Church. Yet, this 
thesis is concerned with Orthodoxy in Estonia, a country that, as previously mentioned, is 
typically known for its lack of religiosity. It is probably safe to assume that the Orthodox 
churches within Estonia, particularly those with high proportions of Russians, foster a 
sense of continuity and cultural remembrance. Due to the small numbers of actual church 
attendance however, something else must be factored in to account for the relevance of 
fostering identity through a faith community.  
Grace Davie fills that gap with the expansive scope of her study on the sociology of 
religion. Having worked her way outward from a the study of religion in a region of Great 
Britain, to the British isles more generally, and now to Western Europe and the United 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Daniele Hervieu-Leger, Religion as a Chain of Memory, trans. Simon Lee (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2000), 82. 
25 Ibid, 81.  
26 Ibid, 125.	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States, she has supplied the discourse on religion in the West with some of its key terms. 
Chief among these is “believing without belonging,” a phrase describing European 
religiosity that has gained a great amount of popularity since its first introduction in her 
1994 book Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging.  The concept is 
fairly straightforward as its wording indicates: it is the phenomenon in which there is a 
discrepancy between what people profess believing in and what they actually practice in 
the religious aspect of their lives or how often they attend church or temple.27  Its 
popularity spoke to the resonance it had throughout Europe when describing its religious 
environment. Though it is still used today quite often, newer scholarship has turned 
towards critiquing the accuracy of the phrase’s claims and Davie herself has moved beyond 
it, realizing that the disconnect between believing and belonging is more complicated than 
a mere catchphrase.  
I agree with Davie’s reassessment considering that the Russian Orthodox Church has 
the opposite problem; statistics within Russia show that most Russians claim the title of 
Orthodox (belonging) without practicing the accompanying faith or adhering to the morals 
it imparts (believing).28 Revisiting this phenomenon, Davie crafted the concept of 
“vicarious religion,” defined as “the notion of religion performed by an active minority but 
on behalf of a much larger number, who (implicitly at least) not only understand, but, quite 
clearly, approve of what the minority is doing.”29  This vicariousness can take place 
through a variety of different forms,30 but ultimately is rooted in churches and the small 
number of engaged believers acting on behalf of the inactive majority.  This small number 
is accepted culturally, welcomed on occasions by both peoples and governments when 
warranted by tradition or need. Davie develops her concept of vicarious religion by 
concentrating on Western Europe, choosing as her demarcating line the split of Orthodoxy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Grace Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) 
28 Alexey D. Krindatch, “Changing relationships between Religion, State and Society in Russia,” GeoJournal 
67 (2006): 277-278. 
29 Grace Davie, “Is Europe an Exceptional Case,” The Hedgehog Review (2006): 24, accessed August 1, 
2014, http://www.dnva.no/binfil/download.php?tid=39409 
30 Forms of vicarious religion: “churches and church leaders perform ritual on behalf of others; church leaders 
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Davie, “Vicarious Religion: A Methodological Challenge,” in Everyday Religion: Observing Modern 
Religious Lives, ed. Nancy T. Ammerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 23.  
	   19	  
and Roman Catholicism, a line she views as far more basic than the communist and non-
communist one that has garnered more attention in recent years. Though she forgoes 
exploration into the Eastern and Central European regions due to their diverse 
denominational preferences, she does acknowledge Estonia as a country clearly facing the 
West, in part due to its Lutheran tradition and in spite of its large Russian neighbor.31  
Davie’s avoidance of this more complex region of Europe directly speaks to the 
intended contributions of this thesis, which aims to further the conversation on the way in 
which religion can act politically and culturally in a country that falls between Russia and 
the greater expanse of Western Europe. The theoretical construct of vicarious religion 
moves one’s attention beyond the numbers that are filling religious buildings on a weekly 
basis and looks at the way in which they preserve a collective memory, the societal role 
they claim and the societal role they actually fulfill, and the agency with which they can act 
and participate in the larger workings of the nation.32 By using Davie’s framework to speak 
to the validity of looking at religion as a minority identity marker in such a presumably 
irreligious country as Estonia, I hope to show that a nation can be strictly religious or 
secular in definition, while also being home to churches and religious communities that are 
sought after in unsettling times and that can minister to national communities in ways that 
go beyond religious doctrine. Davie’s vicarious religion looks to churches as “a form of 
public utility,” a relevant avenue to pursue in distinguishing what services this public utility 
performs and thus what role it plays in minority groups, their identity, and their overall 
representation and interaction with majoritarian communities.33 
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2. Historical Overview   
In conjunction with understanding the underlying themes and scholarship that 
influence the chosen case study, historical analysis is a necessity, as it provides the 
opportunity to see the abovementioned influential theories derived from social science 
integrated into actual events, thus rounding out the landscape of this case study. The 
present day complications inherent to people, religion, and politics will be in no way 
resolved through this historical chapter, but their interaction over time will be clarified. 
When dealing with the Estonian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate and a 
Russian minority in Estonia, a brief look at the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia and its 
philosophy towards its believers abroad is vital. The position of the Russian Orthodox 
Church within Russia, its role, goals, level of influence and subjugation to the Russian state 
and its political leadership, has been debated frequently in recent scholarship and these 
perspectives will be addressed. After a look at the Russian side of this subject, an overview 
of the Estonian context will follow. This will begin with a history of recovered Estonian 
independence and the issues that developed as former Russian-speaking residents of the 
Soviet Union became in many cases Russians without a country. A closer look at the split 
between the two Orthodox churches within Estonia, resulting in the existence of the 
Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC) and the Estonian Orthodox Church-Moscow 
Patriarchate (EOC-MP) within the same canonical territory, will follow. This will lead to a 
discussion on the two Orthodox churches’ current relationship and provide greater context 
for the analysis that is to take place in chapter three of this thesis.  
 
2.1 The Russian Orthodox Church in Russia 
Suppressed as all religious groups were during communist rule, the Russian Orthodox 
Church (ROC) struggled for survival within the Soviet Union as its churches were closed, 
priests and believers sent into the gulag system, and opportunities to minister to its faithful 
were confined to the walls of its dwindling parish churches. The ROC has been criticized 
for its compromises with the reigning atheistic government of that time and its failure to 
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fully defend the faith.34 However, as Orthodoxy is centered around the liturgy itself, its 
most important dimension managed to remain preserved, despite the threats that plagued it. 
So, unbeknownst to the Communist leaders seeking to stamp out religion from the civil 
society of the USSR, their policies gave at least a glimmer of hope in keeping the faith 
alive, though stagnant in its development.35 This glimmer flickered a little brighter both 
during the Second World War when Stalin adopted a temporarily lenient policy towards the 
ROC in an attempt to bolster national morale and again at the onset of perestroika and 
glasnost, during which Gorbachev failed to adhere to the vehemently atheist party line of 
his predecessors.36  
With the fall of communism came the revitalization of religion in Russia. Baptisms and 
other sacramental proceedings surged in number as Russians clamored to reclaim another 
facet of their lives that had been denied them under communism. This rush through the 
church doors was clearly visible by sheer numbers, but the depth of its profundity and 
sincerity was soon called into question.37 The reduction of the former Soviet Union’s size 
resulted in the loss of populations that composed the bulk of the membership for non-
Orthodox religions. With an even more dominant and ethnically homogenous base, the 
ROC was able to quickly reassert itself as the Russia’s historic national church.  Claiming 
Orthodoxy became synonymous with being Russian. John and Carol Garrard found that 
82% of Russians called themselves Orthodox, but only 42% of Russians also called 
themselves believers, leading one to the conclusion that Orthodoxy quickly morphed into a 
strong component of ethnic identity and national pride rather than an adherence to a path of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Particularly condemned is the Declaration of Patriarch Sergius in August of 1927, in which he essentially 
adapted the church to suit the government’s policy of atheism. Though often seen as a desperate effort to 
preserve the ROC in some form, even if an undesirable one, by believers in the West, Orthodox leadership 
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Boris Talantov, "The Moscow Patriarchate and Sergianism," in Orthodox Christian Information Center, 
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 8.  
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Christian discipleship.38 This analysis is widely accepted by most scholars of the Orthodox 
Church in Russia.  
Though the ROC is still lacking the authentic religious fervor from the majority of 
those that claim its membership, the restoration of the Church has often been seen as part of 
the resurrection of Russian civil society. Wallace Daniel highlights how, especially during 
the unsteady years of the early 1990s, the ROC was looked upon as one of the only firm 
institutional foundations in a nation that stood on shaky, uncertain legs. Yeltsin helped to 
pave the way for the acceptance of the ROC as the government’s institutionalized religious 
partner, including the approval of the controversial and underhandedly discriminatory 1997 
law “On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations.”39 While this document is 
generally seen as an official recognition of the ROC as the preferred church by the Russian 
government, it was marketed as a law that would protect Russian Orthodoxy along with 
other traditional religions.40 It divides faith communities into three tiers of categories by 
which communities are classified once officially registered with the state. Each category 
comes with its own corresponding privileges; the ROC is coincidentally the only religious 
association that fulfills the criteria for the highest tier. Furthermore, Putin’s unexpected rise 
to power was paralleled by the ROC’s own rise in prominence, prestige, and interest in 
political involvement.41 Putin’s aim to strengthen the state politically and economically was 
closely tied to mobilizing the Russian people behind the state by creating a greater sense of 
civil society and a more trusting interface between the two realms. For this, Putin turned to 
the ROC, an institution that had already begun establishing a strong church-state 
relationship since the dissolution of the USSR and then marked the beginning of his 
presidency by overseeing the inauguration festivities.42 The continued presence and 
privileged position of the ROC in Russian governmental affairs and ceremonies to this day 
leaves little doubt as to which church ranks as the most influential and esteemed within the 	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present Russian Federation. Though its Christian principles are largely expressed by word 
rather than deed, the ROC has contributed greatly to the reclaiming and redefining of 
Russian identity following the fall of the Soviet Union. Its nationally narrow focus for such 
a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country is clearly problematic, but the strong role of 
the ROC at the start of the post-Soviet period and its continued presence in that position is 
a significant point to consider as one approaches speculation about Russians beyond the 
borders of the motherland.  
The close ties that bind the ROC to the Kremlin have led to debates about which of 
the two has the upper-hand in the relationship. Zoe Knox, a historian of religion in 20th 
century Russia, reintroduced the paradigm connected to the old Byzantine practice of the 
symphonic idea or symphonia, an ideal design of church-state relations in which the two 
are seamlessly aligned with no differentiation between their policy.43 Symphonia ultimately 
results in the abolition of true civil society, as it eliminates the democratic concept of 
freedom of religion and permits one religion or church to establish a monopoly within the 
state, leading to religious and political agendas that are completely interwoven.44 Knox 
does not go so far as to claim that the ROC has or ever will obtain that kind of status, but 
asserts that the attractiveness of this configuration of old still pulls the ROC to cooperate 
with the Kremlin’s desires more readily in return for favored status. The more conservative, 
nationalistic turn in Russia’s politics favors the Patriarchate’s own conservative leanings, 
allowing the ROC to easily take on the role of “principal norm-setter.”45 Through the 
utilization of Orthodox affiliation in the nationalist movements within Russia, these groups 
seek to legitimize their Russianness through a connection with one of its foremost 
institutions. As that nationalism has emerged in more radical forms, particularly during the 
formative years of Patriarch Aleksy’s leadership, his unwillingness to harshly condemn 
acts of aggression and intolerance toward “others” stands as an example in which the ROC 
appeared to be deferring to the power of the state. Alexy’s feeble response to divisive 	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nationalist rhetoric is often credited to his fear of defection to the Ecumenical Patriarch by 
certain groups within the ROC.46 A loss in the number of adherents could result in 
declining influence on people’s lives, which in turn would most likely disrupt the existing 
synergy between church and state.  
However, there is also evidence indicating that the ROC possesses much more agency 
and acts on its own interests than merely being a puppet of the state. Though Patriarch 
Alexy’s policy toward the state may seem weak and inconsistent, his expert political 
maneuvering, opportune decision-making, and willingness to strategically compromise has 
been credited with securing victories for the ROC, both in the sphere of politics and faith 
life, ultimately leading some scholars to label him as a defender of the faith.47 By contrast, 
Patriarch Kirill’s 2012 endorsement of Putin as a “miracle from God” has dramatically cast 
into doubt the sincerity of professed adherence to the separation of church and state within 
Russia.48 However, Katja Richters looks at such recent political acts and statements by the 
ROC and still sees a church driven by its own religious agenda “which it has formulated 
independently of the state and which it seeks to implement by all available means,” even if 
that means working particularly close with the political leadership of the Russian state.49  In 
her view, the administrations of Putin and Medvedev and the ROC shared similar views on 
the historical narrative of the Soviet Union, thereby creating greater opportunities for 
overlap and mutual understanding for moving forward. Just as Putin’s administration has 
been marked by a clear desire to best the West, so too has the Moscow Patriarchate asserted 
a competitive dimension in pursuing its goals. According to Richters, “they have revived 
their ancient competition with the Ecumenical Patriarchate for the position of first amongst 
equals in worldwide Orthodoxy.”50 This is directly relevant to Estonia where the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate claims the parishes belonging to the EAOC as its canonical 
territory. This knowledge, in addition to the clear connection between the ROC and 	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nationalistic groups within Russia, begs the question whether these strong nation-centered 
ties exerted through the Church in Russia apply in its parishes beyond Russia’s border as 
well.  
 
2.2 Post-Soviet Estonia and Issues of Integration 
As the Soviet Union showed itself to be clearly weakening in the 1980s, a renewed 
movement for Estonian independence began to gain support and momentum. Despite years 
of Soviet rule, propaganda and indoctrination, the younger generations recognized the 
uncharacteristic lack of bite being shown by Soviet forces and leadership in various East 
European satellite states and began to speak openly about dangers to the Estonian language 
and culture that many feared to be on the verge of extinction after years of deportations, 
labor migration and Russification. As Estonian nationalism stirred in generations that had 
never known anything but Soviet rule, leaders in the USSR recognized the necessity of 
loosening the strictures in an attempt to prevent an explosive revolt. As expected, with the 
opening of these release valves for public expression, there arose calls for economic 
autonomy and the creation of the Estonian Heritage Society, which elicited negative 
responses from Soviet authorities.51 Furthering the movement toward independence were 
the Night Song Festival in Tallinn in June of 1988 and the Baltic Chain that stretched 
through the three Baltic States in August of 1989 to protest the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact 
signed 50 years earlier and which assigned them to the Soviet sphere of influence. The 
culmination of Estonia’s move towards independence occurred on 20 August 1991 and the 
small Baltic country entered onto the road of self-government and independent statehood 
once more. 
Estonia acquired more than just its long-sought independence. Estonians were now 
responsible for building a state and managing their own bureaucracy and citizenry. Within 
this new state were many Russian-speakers, some of whom had moved to Estonian lands to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Mart Laar, “The Restoration of Independence in Estonia,” in Estonia: Identity and Independence ed. Jean-
Jacques Subrenat (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004), 227, 229. “Estonia’s Return to Independence 1987-1991,” 
Estonia.eu, accessed August 29, 2014, http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/history/estonias-return-to-
independence-19871991.html.  For a condensed but effective summary of the Estonia’s movement towards 
independence from 1984 to 1991, see Mart Laar’s chapter in Estonia: Identity and Independence. The 
author’s personal experience of many of these events enriches the narrative. 
	   26	  
work in Soviet factories, others who, despite their Russian mother-tongue had called 
Estonia home for their entire lives, as had generations before them. Now, in the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the reestablishment of an independent Estonia, many of 
them found themselves stateless in an official sense. Estonia’s move towards independence 
had been spurred on by cultural catalysts, such as the restored use of the blue, black, and 
white flag of the interwar state, the championing of Estonian heritage, and Mati Hint’s 
articles rallying people to the defense of the Estonian language.52 This national pride 
played prominently into how the new government and the nation it served looked towards 
those who were not ethno-linguistically Estonian.  
Focused intently on returning to the West, a goal that looked towards eventual 
European Union and NATO accession, the Estonian government had to develop an 
integration policy alongside criteria for citizenship. Stated in terminology relevant to this 
study, Merje Kuus refers to Estonia’s striving for membership in these international 
organizations as a “counterweight to the proximity of the Orthodox civilization.”53 As the 
legal statehood of Estonia was restored and reconfirmed by the international community, 
the Estonian government officially declared the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic a 
product of an illegal occupation and a political entity that was now null and void. Due to 
that newly declared illegality of that Socialist Republic, those who had come into Estonia 
during the Soviet period could no longer claim they had done so legally. Reapplication was 
necessary to obtain legal alien status and language proficiency was required to obtain full, 
naturalized citizenship. 54 Though the Western institutions whose approval and admittance 
Estonia sought stressed integration and fair treatment of minorities, they also subscribed to 
the Estonian leadership’s view of security and stability as the primary objective. In the 
early period of sovereign territorial re-imagination and taking into account a history laden 	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with foreign occupation, Estonian political elites held the country’s security concerns on 
the same level as nation-state building. Thus, Estonia found itself as another member in the 
ranks of European countries where “civic” and “ethnic” used within “discourses of state, 
security, nation and culture…are only rhetorical variations on the theme of national 
boundaries.”55 Ultimately, the policy indicated a prioritization of stability through security. 
Managing integration in a favorable way, blueprinting the variety of identities society could 
contain and the lines along which interaction between residents should occur, was an 
essential component of realizing that security.56  
The belief that identity is partially a choice, a component to be cultivated rather than 
just inherited, permeates the integration debate in Estonia. The chief tool by which the 
Estonian government did and still believes one can become Estonian is through learning the 
native tongue. Evaluating the 2007 pan-European Intune project polls of political elites, 
economic elites, and the general public, Heinrich Best demonstrated that across the board, 
Estonia has placed heavy emphasis on individuals mastering the national language in order 
to be considered a member of the nation. Ninety-five percent of those polled within the 
general population supported this, as did one hundred percent of the economic elites and 
98.6% of the political elites.57 In a way, a conversion of sorts is almost expected in tandem 
with the acceptance and mastery of the language, as if a Russian-speaker will morph into a 
full-fledged Estonian. Therefore, it is viewed as threatening when Russian-speakers choose 
not to ingratiate themselves with the Estonian state through language acquisition, 
interpreting those who are unable to learn or resistant to the state language as a choosing 
Russia over Estonia. For example, Tartu University’s Market Research Team in its 1997 
report claimed that the failure of non-Estonians living in Estonia to consider Russia’s 
actions as threatening in instances when Estonians do leads to the conclusion “that residing 
in Estonia, non-Estonians accept and consider….Russia’s potential malevolent actions 
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against Estonia [normal].”58 These trends and attitudes towards post-Soviet integration 
within Estonia show clearly that elements of cultural difference also become security 
concerns and are debated with a heavier tone than one would expect.  
With a quarter of the population being Russian or Russian-speaking, the need for 
integration policy has been present from the beginning. Every couple of years, new 
integration reports, modules, and proposals are introduced, implemented and assessed. As 
the years have gone by, new fields of assessment are taken into account as the demographic 
picture of Estonia and the levels with which its minority populations are integrated become 
increasingly clear. This most recent report examined markers of linguistic, legal and 
political integration among non-Estonian ethnic groups. Overall categories of integration 
were dictated by citizenship status, whether the individual considered Estonia to be one’s 
homeland, whether the individual viewed oneself as a part of people embraced by the 
constitution, and by their level of proficiency in Estonian.59  Initially, however, focused 
attention to the process and an in-depth understanding about the way in which Russian-
speakers integrated themselves into society were not a political priority. “For the newly 
restored Republic of Estonia, the main problem was not the real integration of the Russian 
speaking population, but regulation of their legal status and social position, which was done 
[primarily] through the Citizenship Act, the Aliens Act, and the Language Act.”60  
Therefore, the greatest concentration was placed on language acquisition as a key to 
naturalization, in order to reduce the “threat” of such large numbers of non-Estonians 
within the nation’s borders.61   
The integration programs changed as Estonia looked towards European Union 
accession. Minority issues in this small Baltic republic were one of the main areas that the 
EU deemed as needing to be addressed. Standards were adjusted and a new motivation 
fueled the drive towards integration. Primary focus was given to easily measured, surface 
criteria such as “reducing the number of people with undetermined citizenship [and] 	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adapting language skill requirement to EU norms.”62 However, the rush to join the EU 
constituted a patchwork approach to integration, one that ignored social and civil cohesion, 
education, and cross-cultural exchange among the population. Minority groups banded 
together against the integration policy rather than assimilate with the greater Estonian 
society. Following the achievement of joining the EU, but in light of the continued 
problems between minority and majority populations, integration policy has shifted to a 
more detailed focus on truly incorporating minority members into Estonian society and 
helping to carve out a sense of belonging and identification centering on Estonia as their 
home. While the numbers of survey respondents who identify Estonia as their only 
homeland have grown, even among those living in Estonia who possess Russian 
citizenship, integration still has a long way to go.63 Alongside small victories have been 
increasingly polarized attitudes towards integration, undoubtedly mirroring the polarizing 
political situation between Russia and the West. The fear and hostility with which 
Estonians looks toward Russia is understandable; 19% of youth between the ages of 15 and 
19 have chosen not to pursue Estonian citizenship despite being born, raised and educated 
there, while 12% indicated a preference for Russian citizenship.64 Analysts indicate that a 
key to integration success is to engage minorities as participants and benefactors of the 
policies, rather than simply objects of a political agenda.65 
 
2.3 The Orthodox Church in Estonia 
The Estonian government’s fear of the formation of two nations within a single state 
drives its integration policy. The development of separate societies is related to issues of 
identity and the ways in which it is transmitted. Institutions, often supranational in their 
reach and influence, aid this transference. This uneasiness with duality found in Estonia’s 
national integration concerns is mirrored in the conflict surrounding the two Orthodox 
churches that call Estonia part of their territory. Verdery’s abovementioned work illustrates 
how dead bodies of past religious leaders can cultivate robust patriotism and church-	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specific pride. These bodies become tools, imbued with anachronistic preferences and 
aims. In the case of Estonia, the bodies Verdery explicates can be replaced by the physical 
church buildings themselves. Though residing in a largely un-churched state, the two 
churches have had roles in the reawakening of Estonian nationalism or the ways in which 
links with Russia, its language, and the Russian minority have chafed against Estonian 
nationalism.  
 
2.3.1 The Conflict Between the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox 
Church and Estonian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate 
Orthodoxy has existed in Estonia for over a thousand years. Though the country is 
primarily identified as a Lutheran one in terms of religious preference (if one is to classify 
this extremely secular society by a Christian denomination), Orthodox Christianity has a 
long history in this northernmost Baltic state. The Estonian Church fell under the 
jurisdiction of Moscow, until it received autonomous status in 1920. Autonomy within the 
Orthodox Church means that churches are self-governing to an extent; the head of such a 
church must still be confirmed or appointed by the autocephalous church, to which the 
autonomous church is subordinate. An autocephalous church is one capable of appointing 
its own head; the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople or the Moscow Patriarchate in 
Russia are examples of such churches.66 Therefore, this autonomous status granted in 1920 
made the Estonian Orthodox Church responsible for its own affairs, but still dependent on 
the ROC leadership based in Moscow for appointment of its bishops. The increased 
atheistic propaganda and persecution of believers by the Communist regime in Russia 
weakened the ROC and its ability to communicate with those churches beyond Soviet 
borders but that still remained under its authority. In light of this, the Estonian Church 
appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople in 1923 for autocephalous status, in 
order to no longer remain dependent on a church from which it was so disconnected. 
Instead of autocephaly, Patriarch Meletius granted the Estonian Orthodox Church a tome of 
autonomy, a church document officially granting and recognizing its autonomous status 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 John Meyendorff, The Orthodox Church: Its Past and Its Role in the World Today trans. John Chapin (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1968), 143. 
	   31	  
from the Moscow Patriarchate, which subsequently altered the title (and therefore the 
responsibilities) of Archbishop of Tallinn to Metropolitan of Tallinn and All Estonia.67 
Though this act was technically uncanonical in the eyes of the Church, as it requires 
recognition of release by the former mother church, the circumstances within the Soviet 
Union and the inability of the ROC to monitor and advise clergy in their territories 
warranted such changes for the time being.68 This change in status and patriarchal 
jurisdiction became the crux of the conflict in the newly independent Estonian state in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s.  
However, this new metropolitan status of the Estonian Orthodox Church disappeared in 
the wake of the Soviet annexation in 1940. At that time, despite what the ROC leadership 
viewed as a great sin for leaving its former patriarchate without permission, the Estonian 
Orthodox Church was reabsorbed into the Moscow Patriarchate, where it remained until the 
forthcoming schism in 1996. Part of the Estonian Orthodox Church, including Metropolitan 
Alexander who was acting as the head of the church following the bestowal of the 1923 
tome, fled into exile in Stockholm where the Synod of the EAOC remained until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1978, the Ecumenical Patriarch Dimitrios proceeded to 
recognize in a letter to the Scandinavian Metropolitan Paulus that there was no longer a 
need for the tome given by Patriarch Meletius since the communication between the ROC 
and the Estonian church had been restored and was being maintained. 69  The 1923 tome 
was declared “inoperative” by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which meant, “that the Tomos 
could not be enforced within Estonia which at that time comprised part of the Soviet 
Union; the Tomos, however, was not regarded as being void, invalid or revoked.”70  	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During communist rule, all churches in Estonia found themselves persecuted and the 
Orthodox Church could feel the blows most acutely as it still carried the status of the 
church of the czars and the stigma of being of the old Russia. Here it is important to 
remember something that often gets forgotten in light of the present-day divide between 
Orthodox churches in Estonia. All peoples of faith were persecuted during this time, 
regardless of whether they were native Russian or Estonian-speaking. Those who remained 
dedicated to their faith as the USSR attempted to build a socialist utopia did so as a form of 
their own personal resistance. In this way, “Russian Orthodox believers were similar to the 
Estonian Christians of the same generation.”71 It is also worth noting that the heads of both 
the Lutheran and Orthodox churches within Estonia, Archbishop Edgar Hark and 
Metropolitan Alexy, were both recruited during their careers by the KGB and have files 
indicating their cooperation.72 
Following Estonian independence, the internal Orthodox conflict came to fruition once 
more, quickly making past confusion over territorial and patriarchal affiliations appear 
simple in comparison. Metropolitan Alexy was elected Patriarch, leaving his former 
position in Tallinn to Kornilii. From Moscow in 1993, Alexy restored the autonomy of the 
Estonian Orthodox Church that had been first granted in 1920. Following this act, the 
Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs requested that all religious associations register with 
the state. A small group of priests and parishes had been rallying around the idea of 
continuing in the footsteps of the Stockholm Synod in exile by continuing to view 
themselves as separate from the ROC, motivated by the belief that the ROC was an 
oppressive and collusive partner to the former Soviet state and its Russian heir. This small 
contingent registered as the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, the name with which the 
newly autonomous Orthodox Church identified and hoped to claim. With this name now 
taken, the larger contingent of the Orthodox Church in Estonia was left to register under the 
name of the Estonian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, a nod to both its autonomous 	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status and mother church in Russia.73 Failure to acquire the historic name of the Orthodox 
church in Estonia lost for the EOC-MP any entitlement to the restitution of property that 
would be forthcoming to the church bearing that name, as it was the name of the sole 
Orthodox Church in Estonia before the Soviet occupation, now deemed illegal. The value 
of the churches, buildings and territory that the EAOC received through this restitution act 
amounted to approximately 400 million Euros and made the EOC-MP parishes using those 
buildings liable to eviction by their new, lawful owners.74  
From this point forward, tensions ran high between the two Orthodox churches. 
Contestation and conflict between the EOC-MP and EAOC regarding property and 
canonical territory flared. The Orthodox Church is divided into many territories, and 
though they often correspond with national, ethnic, or linguistic boundaries, they are not 
supposed to be national in design, as each canonical territory should pursue brotherly 
relations with the neighboring leaders, parishes, and dioceses as participants in the same 
unifying faith.75 In 1996, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew issued a synodical act, 
reactivating the tome of 1923, thus placing the EAOC under his patriarchy.76 This act was 
done so due to the profession of continued validity of the tome despite its temporary 
suspension in 1978. This marked the official “return to the fatherland” of “the exiled 
Autonomous Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church.”77 The presence of now two 
autonomous churches, falling under the heads of two different patriarchates, cast Estonia’s 
Orthodox communities into questionable areas of canonical law. The existence of 
territories of two autocephalous churches overlapping within one country was a technical 
impossibility and ran counter to Orthodox law. This problem was somewhat resolved with 
the meetings of members from both sides in Zurich later in that same year of 1996. Here an 	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agreement was made that allowed individual parishes within Estonia to choose which 
Patriarch they would follow while also attempting to repair the Patriarchates relationships 
with each other.78  Certain stipulations formulated at this meeting never came to fruition, 
such as to the agreement to equal status within Estonia, which the EOC-MP interpreted as 
receiving property from the EAOC that had once been its, thus allowing it to own rather 
than rent. Richters notes that this agreement, as well as others, made at the Zurich meeting, 
were more of a testament to good intentions and repairing relationships than they were 
indicators of realistic action.79 Such legal issues are resolved by rulings of the Estonian 
state, rather than by ecumenical councils of Orthodoxy.  
Presently, the issue of property remains a sore point of contention. Its continued 
prominence in dialogue between the churches will be evident further on in this thesis as it 
found its way into all of the research interviews conducted. This specific conflict has 
morphed from a legal issue into one with deeper connotations. One priest writes, “we are 
not fighting for material gain. …The change of property status, the transfer from being 
tenants of the church buildings constructed by our ancestors to being property owners is a 
matter of principle, rather than of material gain.”80 Many within the EOC-MP feel that 
these conflicts stem from a suspicion of the EOC-MP due to its connection with Russia. 
However, there is truth to both sides of this argument.  
A solution could have been formulated from the beginning of the conflict. Various 
countries around the world contain Orthodox churches answering to various patriarchs 
within their borders. However, the ROC views itself as the mother church to Orthodox 
churches in almost all of the former Soviet republics, a territory which is “religiously 
defined [as] ‘Greater Russia.’”81  This mother church has at the forefront of its international 
interests the maintenance of its jurisdiction over this region and the continued presence of 
churches subordinate to its leadership. With the breaking up of the Soviet Union, the ROC 
did not also want to lose its territory as well and has made this its key focus. The escalated 
nature of the conflict with the Ecumenical Patriarchate regarding Estonia is an example of 	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this jurisdictional claim. Richters posits that the ROC could have simply termed the 
Russian Orthodox believers in Estonia as a diaspora, which would then open the door for a 
conflict-free shared canonical territory between the two patriarchates.82 The ROC’s failure 
to do this and instead turn towards defending its territory against encroaching brother 
churches speaks to the importance that the church leadership in Moscow places on 
maintaining these historic areas of influence. Rohtmets and Ringvee credit the religious 
revival that occurred (only to later decline in the years following independence) in Estonia 
in part to feelings of “national awakening.”83 Churches like the Estonian Lutheran Church, 
historically viewed as the Christian denomination of choice in Estonia, and the newly 
acknowledged EAOC had overt ties to an Estonian legacy, heritage and culture, in addition 
to vocally supporting Estonian independence movements. Though the ROC was in favor of 
the USSR’s lessening of restrictions on religious communities, it remained on the fringes of 
the nationalist movements, fearful of their ability to create new divisions among the 
peoples of the republics.84 In the case of the resulting conflict between the two Orthodox 
churches in Estonia, such fears were partially justified.  
In the early years of Estonia’s restored independence, the ROC largely failed to 
convince Estonians of any real admiration and respect for Estonia beyond its status as a 
piece of its canonical territory. However, the unavoidable link with Russia thrust an 
immediate negative stigma on the EOC-MP from the start that it still struggles to combat 
today. Many of the congregations that chose to stay under the leadership of the Moscow 
Patriarchate did so out of custom and canonical reasoning, rather than out of Russian 
nationalist vigor. Additionally, the transition of the EOC-MP’s legacy from an oppressed 
fellow faith community to that of an “occupation” church was a harsh turn for the Church’s 
hierarchy and followers to stomach. Many priests and parishioners, including Archbishop 
Kornilii himself, had been brought before Soviet courts and sent to prisons for the pursuit 
of their faith. Often, one can hear the EOC-MP referred to as “the martyr church” since it 
was the church that remained in Estonia during the Soviet times, while the EAOC had gone 	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into exile in Stockholm.85 The stripping of this label and its replacement with that of 
“collaborator” is understandably highly offensive to the EOC-MP. This imposition of an 
occupation legacy on the EOC-MP has also brought out a more pronounced ethnic 
dimension to this conflict. Just as both Estonians and ethnic Russians were persecuted by 
the Soviet authorities, so too do both Orthodox churches contain members of both Estonian 
and Russian heritage, as well as other Russian-speaking minorities living within Estonia. 
While most Russian-speakers gravitate towards the EOC-MP and most Orthodox Estonians 
towards the EAOC, the ethnic divide that has become more pronounced over the years is 
most detrimental to members of the EOC-MP. Associating with that church has the ability 
to automatically undermine any chance of distinguishing individual loyalties, background, 
or national-political feelings. Patriarch Bartholomew’s letter to Patriarch Alexy of Moscow 
in 1996 displayed the prevalence of this snap judgment, asking “how can a Church be 
called Estonian when it is made up of Russian immigrants?”86 
Today, though the conflict between the two churches no longer rages as it did in the 
first formative years of the new Estonian state, relationships between them remain cold and 
distant. One interviewee encouraged me to take note of how the Archbishops interacted at 
formal events, exclaiming, “it is amazing to see how they can enter the room without one 
single look or glimpse at the other representative,…how they can just avoid each other. 
Even if you look at the pictures, they don’t stand side by side.”87 The latest 
Tegevusaruanne (activity report) from the Estonian Council of Churches gives the numbers 
of faithful for each respective church, though it should be noted that membership is self-
reported. The EAOC has 65 congregations and approximately 28,000 members. The EOC-
MP has 36 congregations and approximately 170,000 members.88 Determining how these 
churches influence the lives of those members and to what extent the politics at the top of 
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their hierarchies permeate through their congregations will help to separate reality from 
long-standing grudges at the top.   
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3. Data and Analysis  
The following section will concentrate on the presentation and analysis of the data that 
forms the core of research for this thesis. This material comes in two main parts: statistical 
data from various sources and personal interviews with experts. Each of these elements will 
be supplemented by the theoretical background introduced earlier on in this thesis, 
additional secondary texts, and pertinent media excerpts. The focus is placed on the three 
research aims of determining whether religion fosters identity within minority groups in a 
significant way, whether religious communities linked with minority groups help or hinder 
their overall integration into society, and ultimately determining whether religion has an 
important place in the processes of reconciling national and minority identity.  
 
3.1 Methodology 
This case study addresses only the Estonian case in detail. To use this case study 
effectively, an understanding of the history of the Estonian state and of these key faith 
communities within the country are paramount, hence the previous historical section. In 
addition to pertinent history, analysis of statistical and survey data, conducted and compiled 
by both the Estonian state and third party companies and NGOs, will comprise a portion of 
this thesis’s source base. The Elust, usust ja usuelust surveys conducted by the Estonian 
Council of Churches, the Integration Monitoring Survey reports, and Estonian national 
censuses form the base of these sources. The Estonian Council of Churches has conducted 
surveys under the name of Elust, usust ja usuelust (EUU, which translates to Life, Religion 
and Religious Life) every five years from 1995 until the present regarding matters of faith 
and belief among the people living in Estonia.89  The surveys from the years 1995, 2000, 
and 2005 were conducted by mail. The results could only be calculated from those surveys, 
which were mailed back to the ECC. As many of the experts interviewed for this thesis 
noted, following the dictates of common sense, the results were affected by the willingness 
of individuals to participate. It can be assumed that those who returned their surveys 
personally view the topics of faith and religion as important ones or simply have distinct 	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views that they wished to share. The 2010 EUU surveys were conducted face-to-face rather 
than through the post. This round of surveys engaged a more diverse sampling of the 
population, speaking to a greater number of people who potentially would not have taken 
part otherwise had a survey shown up in their mailbox. 
I was fortunate enough to obtain the computational tables of survey data from the 
Estonian Council of Churches in which the numbers and percentages of responses were 
recorded and then further broken down into categories such as age, language of survey, 
believer or non-believer, etc.90 These particular surveys not only provide a picture of the 
Estonian religious landscape, but also allow for a general overview of the trends in this 
segment of civil society over a span of ten years. 
 The Estonian Integration Monitoring Summary report, Integration Strategy 
Summary and Implementation plans, and Estonian censuses provided not only a numerical 
look at the composition of the state through a variety of ways, but a helpful analysis of the 
past and present integration measures and their effectiveness. The Integration Monitoring 
Summary was compiled by the Praxis Center for Policy Studies and contracted by the 
Estonian Ministry of Culture. Therefore, though I found it extremely helpful to my research 
and well-balanced in its approach, its Estonian roots are worth acknowledging. All of the 
abovementioned sources helped me to explore my research aims by allowing me to look at 
religious and minority numbers side-by-side in a certain capacity, while also taking into 
account integrative measures and the corresponding results and feedback.  
However, when examining such broadly defined categories as religion and identity, the 
aims of this thesis cannot be realized solely through quantitative methods. Therefore, 
material collected from interviews with six experts in Estonia will contribute new material 
to accompany the historical, theoretical, and statistical research components of this thesis. 
Over the course of a week, I spoke with six experts residing in the cities of Tallinn and 
Tartu whose connections to my study ranged from the Estonian Council of Churches 
executive committee, to priests of both Orthodox churches, to professors of religion. 
Though half of my interview sample was not affiliated with any of the Orthodox churches, 	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surveys for each question.	  
	   40	  
they were all Estonians who possessed a connection to the issue of religion in Estonia 
whether through their work or academic specialty. By speaking with individuals of diverse 
occupations and affiliations, it allowed me to compare perspectives while discerning the 
most salient topics. Interviews were obtained by reaching out to interviewees via email 
through my own research or the suggestion of other Estonians.91 Many of my interviewees 
were helpful in leading me towards other potential contacts prior to or following our 
meeting.  
I entered each interview with the same prepared set of questions, and occasionally some 
additional ones, oftentimes specific to the interviewee’s role.92 All interviews were 
recorded on a portable recording device and later transcribed in full. At the start of each 
interview, participants were asked introductory questions such as to describe the religious 
environment of Estonia, the state of the relationship between the two Orthodox churches in 
Estonia, and their general perceptions of each. Each interviewee received the key question: 
“Is the Russian Orthodox community centered more on a national/cultural/ethnic identity or 
on a Christian identity?” This was a key question not only as one of the main questions of 
my study, but also from the perspective of my respondents, many of whom spent an 
exponentially greater amount of time expressing their opinions on this question compared 
to others and showing careful detail in clarifying its nuances. Interviewees were also asked 
whether they believed the Orthodox churches helped or hindered Russian integration into 
Estonian society and the role they believed these churches played within the Russian 
minority. Most of the time, the responses to these questions in which they cited statistics or 
historical events confirmed data or history already found through my own research, 
increasing my own confidence in my interview subjects. Following the transcription of 
these interviews, I combed through each transcript and located key themes that ran through 
all six of the conversations. These themes are now presented in the following subheadings 
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  I am particularly indebted to my advisor, Dr. Alar Kilp, and Faculty of Theology member, Irina Paert.	  	  
92 This list of questions can be found in the appendices of this thesis.  
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of this chapter and also serve to answer my more detailed questions about my chosen 
Estonian case study.93 	  
As interviews formed a key component of this thesis’s research base, their personal and 
subjective nature must be recognized. As community leaders and experts in their fields, 
interviewees’ positions undoubtedly affected the information they chose to divulge and the 
extent to which they were able to do so. Once again, as none of the interviewees were 
native English speakers, the depth or clarity of these conversations was occasionally 
affected. In evaluating the whole of the abovementioned data, their limitations must be 
acknowledged. Being neither a native Russian or Estonian speaker, I have had to rely on 
sources and interviewees that deliver their arguments in English. Smaller, more easily 
translatable forays have been made into Estonian and Russian sources where possible. 
While this does limit the scope of the thesis, impressively high English fluency in Estonia 
and copious English translations of government documents and records reduce this 
disadvantage. 
 
3.2 An Ethnic or Christian Identity? 
For the 1995 EUU survey, approximately 1,500 surveys were returned from which to 
elucidate results. Of those, 961 were Estonian language surveys and 545 were Russian. 
While there are Russian-speakers living in Estonia who are not ethnically Russians, 
perhaps hailing from another former Soviet republic, this distinction between language and 
ethnicity is not made in any of the four surveys conducted by the ECC. The only 
differentiation between Estonians or Russians is made through the language category. 
However, it is more than likely that most of the respondents to the Russian language 
version of the survey were indeed ethnic Russians since according to the Estonian Ministry 
of Culture, of the national groups living in Estonia, 69% are Estonian and 25% Russian, 
with only 2%, 1%, and 0.8% of the population composed of Ukrainians, Belarusians, and 	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  Is the EOC-MP perpetuating the ROC’s fixation on maintaining strong regional ties and influence, 
suspiciously similar to the Kremlin’s own priorities, by forestalling integrative measures? Do the two 
Orthodox churches in Estonia primarily serve as markers of ethnic identity rather than adherence to faith or 
doctrine? And ultimately, what are the key issues and areas of disagreement between churches and how are 
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Finns, respectively.94 Of those who answered the Estonian-language surveys in 1995, only 
15% confidently classified themselves as believers, as opposed to the Russian respondents 
of whom 37.4% claimed to be believers. Alternatively, the Estonian-language surveys were 
completed by more individuals who identified themselves as staunch atheists than those 
who completed the Russian surveys.95   
This trend continues throughout the 2000 and 2005 surveys. Almost 62% of the survey 
participants in 2000 who identified themselves as believers were those who had filled out 
the Russian-language survey, as opposed to those who responded to the Estonian version, 
who composed only 22.4% of self-professed believers. In 2005, 43.6% of those claiming to 
be believers had filled out the Estonian surveys, with the other 56.4% of believers coming 
from those who had chosen the Russian-language option. These numbers are percentages of 
those that claimed to be believers, which on its own, is consistently a small group among 
the overall pool of survey respondents each year. Overall, when not broken down according 
to language, the number of those that claim themselves as believers consistently remain 
well below 50% of the population.96 However, these percentages have the potential to 
suggest that believers, though a minority, are becoming a significant one among both 
Estonian and Russian speakers. An interesting trend has been the increase in the number of 
those who call themselves believers over this ten-year span. One could postulate that this 
trend is linked to the nature of the survey: those who view religion as more important will 
be more enthusiastic about filling out and returning the survey. This seems especially likely 
when considering the numbers shown in the 2010 EUU surveys, which were conducted 
orally and surveyed a greater proportion of people. In the 2010 survey, those who identified 
themselves confidently as believers only composed 12.7% of the overall survey base. The 
category with which respondents identified most was “indifferent towards believing,” with 
33.3% of total participation. This much smaller percentage than those recorded for previous 
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years leads one to believe that the population sampling method was indeed a factor in the 
results, rather than a sudden pronounced aversion to religion in the last five years.  
What the surveys do show, regardless of their year, is the greater likelihood of minority 
ethnic groups to identify themselves as believers or in religious terms, when compared with 
ethnic Estonians. Ringo Ringvee, an advisor in the Department of Religious Affairs at the 
Ministry of the Interior, notes that typical congregation numbers for Estonians and 
Russians are fairly close. The Estonian Council of Churches’ 2010 EUU survey validates 
this assumption. The Lutheran Church, cast as the prototypical “Estonian” faith option, and 
the Orthodox Church, the assumed “Russian” church of choice, boast 44.2% and 32.4% of 
all survey participants respectively, both clearly outranking the other Christian 
denominations and faiths listed.  In the 2011 census the following year, of the quarter of the 
Estonian population claiming a religious affiliation, sixteen percent identified as Orthodox, 
as compared to Lutheranism’s ten percent.97 After indicating the relative closeness in the 
numbers of those professing membership in a congregation, Ringvee concludes that the 
difference between Estonians and minority groups is in the prevalence of actual belief and 
in the way by which it is incorporated into their identity.98 Putting his finger on a subject 
that is difficult to quantify through census or ECC surveys, Ringvee employed the word 
“identity” to locate the noticeable difference between claiming a faith community, even if 
the levels of activity and true Christian belief appear low, and the minority status. “Maybe 
it has something to do with, well let’s say, immigrant background…It’s part of the identity. 
…Basically every ethnic minority here, when they have these kind of strong religious 
traditions, it’s not just religion. It’s also part of the ethnic identity.”99 Despite Estonians’ 
growing reputation for being an incredibly secular, un-churched nation, they have also 
shown the same tendency to locate their ethnicity in conjunction with a religion, when 
experiencing minority status. “Even the religiously passive Estonians, when they were 
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exiled, the exile communities of the 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s, then the religion was not just 
religion. It was also the ethnic part.”100  
Ringvee’s explanation of religion’s more prominent role among ethnic Russians was 
one shared by all of my interviewees. Archpriest Toomas Hirvoja, a native Estonian and 
priest of the Estonian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, commented on the fine line 
between Orthodox churches and the ethnic link with which they are often bestowed. He 
used the term ethno-phyletism, which is the unfortunate situation when a church and 
nation’s boundaries are confused; the church becomes classified by the components of the 
country in which it resides, identifying strongly with a single race, language, or territory 
and forgetting its broader Christian mission.101 This is un-canonical according to the 
Orthodox Church, but becomes a complicated issue as most of the various Orthodox 
churches in Central and Eastern Europe are somehow defined by the country where they 
are located or the ethnicity that composes its congregation. Some would classify the schism 
between the two Estonian Orthodox churches as motivated by ethno-phyletistic sentiments 
and that the separation between the churches at present has retained ethnicity as its primary 
line of division. Father Toomas indicated that one does not have to forsake one’s ethnicity, 
language, or nation in order to be a good Orthodox congregant, but instead simply 
acknowledge the primacy of the Orthodox Church’s unity within this hierarchy of personal 
loyalties.102 For comparison, a similar philosophy is evident in the Roman Catholic Church, 
where the Pope is not looked to as a political leader above one’s head of state, but members 
of the faith are encouraged to vote and live along the lines of Church principles and 
doctrine within their various communities. In both situations, believers are called to live 
their cultures, but not at the expense of or contrary to their overall faith.  
This is easier said than done and the perceptions of where each marker—Christian or 
ethnic—falls along the chain of importance was what I hoped to gain from my interview 
subjects. The majority of my interviewees acknowledged that the EOC-MP evoked more of 
an ethnic and nationally-based identity than one purely grounded in a shared faith. Some 	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101 Father Theodore Paraskevopoulos. "Ethnophyletism." Sermon, Ancient Faith Radio, December 13, 2010, 
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102 Archpriest Toomas Hirvoja, in interview with author, June 6, 2014.  
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hesitated to give a decisive answer, diplomatically qualifying their statements by saying 
that the trend of aligning closer with ethnicity than with faith was a visible phenomenon, 
but not necessarily one indicative of the entire EOC-MP minority population.103 Others 
unequivocally declared that “definitely” the national and cultural elements took 
precedence.104 Two priests from the EOC-MP provided remarkably similar responses to 
this question, illustrating in their answers the blurred lines between ethno-phyletism, 
religion, identity, heritage, and external homelands.  
When asked the aforementioned key question, Father Toomas felt that particularly in 
the religious community he shepherds, an Orthodox church in Nõmme, faith is at the 
forefront. Particularly as an Estonian in what many people see as a distinctly Russian 
church, he professed that he does not feel that he ministers in a church that is not his own. 
After all, its title is the Estonian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, not the Russian 
Orthodox Church. He serves a local church, a local people and thus feels the primary 
connection through this faith community rather than through a shared ethnicity. Both 
Father Toomas and a fellow EOC-MP priest, Father Igor, drew attention to the vast number 
of Russians or Russian-speakers who claim Orthodoxy as their religion, yet the small 
numbers who actually attend services and actively participate in the church, as if to show 
that being Russian does not make that person a practicing member of the Orthodox Church. 
The EOC-MP churches face the same quandary as their brother churches in Russia; many 
Russians claim to be Orthodox, but each Sunday the services are poorly attended. “Where 
are those people?” Father Toomas asked laughing, before labeling these already professed 
Orthodox a primary—and paradoxical—field for missionary work.105 The 2010 EUU 
survey also testifies to this paradox. Equipped with questions that probed deeper for moral 
judgments, the results showed that Christian principles were not claimed by as many as 
those who claimed to be believers or even members of the congregation. While some 	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questions resulted in a majority of participants being morally and socially opposed to 
homosexuality, human cloning, infidelity, and other behaviors that the church typically 
does not condone, euthanasia, premarital sex and cohabitation enjoyed the support of the 
majority of those polled.106  Through these surveys, a slightly more conservative picture of 
Estonia is painted, but they also indicate that religion is potentially not the main motivator 
for these attitudes, as respondents appear to pick and choose rather than follow an 
unwavering line. In fact, this inconsistency of adherence to church beliefs speaks directly to 
the strong cultural basis of the church, rather than one of faith.  
Despite the diversity of attitudes and creeping secularism each of these priests spoke of, 
later on in their interviews, unsolicited comments were made that indicated a clear 
connection between Russian ethnicity and the church.  Father Toomas, an Estonian by 
birth, was initially baptized in the Lutheran church but sought deeper spiritual communion 
that he did not feel this church could provide. This search led him to the Orthodox Church, 
what is now the EOC-MP, for at the time of his conversion the schism had not yet 
occurred. When addressing the question as to why Orthodoxy appears to be growing in 
popularity in Estonia in recent years, he supposed that his own experience might mirror 
those of other Estonians who are looking for something more mystical, something that 
better satisfies their spiritual needs.107 For Russians though, he claimed that “they are 
discovering their roots; this is quite natural for them to find Orthodoxy if they are looking 
for their roots.”108 Here he links Orthodoxy and Russianness quite closely, saying that 
Orthodoxy is inevitably found in traditional Russian culture. Father Igor Prekup speaks 
similarly. When asked if Orthodoxy is tied to an ethnic, national culture, he too first 
reminded me that not all Orthodox are Russian. Instead of following this statement with the 
expected “nor are all Russians Orthodox,” he chose to speak about the way in which the 
Russian nation had been distinctively shaped by Orthodoxy.  Prior to Christianity (in this 
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case, the chosen form was Orthodoxy), Russia was merely a territory inhabited by Slavic 
tribes. Orthodoxy unified them around a central Orthodox political figure.  
This belief in Orthodoxy as the central factor that had not only created a “national 
religion [but] also helped the formation of the state” echoes the symphonia theory that Zoe 
Knox puts forth.109  Just as a symphonic structure removes any separation between ruler 
and church, Prekup sees the two—the Russian nation and the Orthodox Church—as 
historically indivisible to this day. Historically, I would agree that the Orthodox Church 
must be acknowledged as a central institution in Russia’s pre-Soviet history. It was the 
priest’s following comments on modern Russians and Russian-speakers link to that history 
that clarified what he saw as an indivisible bond between Orthodoxy and ethnicity. “If a 
Russian person [or] a Russian-speaking person is not Orthodox, he doesn’t find, doesn’t 
have this association with his national roots. He doesn’t connect with these national 
roots.”110 The priests claim that their faith community is Orthodox first and Russian and/or 
Russian-speaking second. Certainly, this is plausible for many of their parishioners. 
However, their stress on Orthodoxy as a central component to the Russian ethnic heritage 
continues to enter into their narratives. Combined with the number of those who claim 
Orthodoxy as their religious denomination opposed to those who actually express belief in 
its teachings, one can conclude that the Church offers a greater ethnic resonance than faith-
based significance. To follow Grace Davie’s line, Russians belong to the Orthodox church 
without believing and, in doing so, they are vicariously Orthodox but wholly culturally 
Russian.  
This Church’s cultural significance is not only witnessed in the EOC-MP. An EAOC 
priest, Father Aivar Sarapik, chose to highlight the sameness of Orthodox tradition across 
the board—the liturgy, the theology, the dogma. Conflict springs from the culture and it is 
the culture attached to each church (the EAOC and the EOC-MP) that separates them rather 
than joining them together. “We don’t need the Moscow or whatever it is, in group 
dynamics,” he said, meaning the different brands of Orthodoxy. “What we need is the 
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Church and that’s what counts.”111  The information gleaned from these interviews and 
surveys complements the findings of scholarly literature. Jaanus Plaat conducted a study 
where he compared and cross-examined a wide-array of religious survey data taken among 
Estonians and Russians in Estonia, incorporating some of the surveys that this thesis has 
also employed, to construct a better picture of Estonians’ religiosity, as well as that of the 
country’s minorities. He too concluded that Orthodoxy contributed to the construction of 
identity for the Russian minority, in a strong ethnic sense rather than a deeply religious one, 
though its members were openly more religious than their Estonian counterparts. Just as 
joining the Lutheran church became a way in which Estonians expressed their discontent, 
rebellion, and ethnic solidarity during Soviet times, Plaat claims that so too do Russians 
claim Orthodoxy as an assertion of their Russianness within Estonia.112 “Where ethnicity 
and religion are correlated in a population that lives in the sphere of dominance of a 
multinational state…, religion is likely to become a core element of national identity 
formation and a rallying point.”113 Though Estonia’s population is small, the prominence of 
the ethnic and cultural connection between Russia, the Orthodox Church and the Russian 
minority still appear strong and central to those who profess Orthodox membership.  
Religion comes equipped with a cultural collective memory, a memory that is 
constantly morphing, deciding what is important to remember and record, and what is 
superfluous and can be forgotten. This memory is “mobilized” in the words of Hervieu-
Legér through religion, expressed in its ability to bring significant history to the forefront 
and enliven it by practices such as the liturgy and other religious traditions.114 Belonging to 
this “lineage of belief” is the foundation of religious self-definition, placing its strength in 
long-standing tradition and group existence, legitimized by its longevity. This is clear in 
Prekup’s comments on the history of the Russian state and the dependence of its formation 
on the Russian Orthodox Church. This impressive claim elicits pride in one’s Russian and 
Orthodox “roots” and taps into a cultural continuity that transcends time. Once again, 	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Father Toomas provides an excellent example from his own life of the value that the church 
under the Moscow Patriarchate places on continuity and loyalty. At the time of the schism, 
his spiritual father gave him the freedom to choose to break with the church and follow his 
fellow Estonian clerics or to stay in the church that had baptized him, confirmed him, and 
ordained him as a priest. He did not believe in breaking with the church for national or 
ethnic reasons, nor did he desire to sever himself from the “lineage of belief” that the 
church under the Moscow Patriarchate in Estonia contained. Often, he calls the ROC the 
“mother church” to the EOC-MP, indicating a canonical loyalty as well as a reminder of 
the kinship-like ties between the Moscow see and its autonomous Estonian arm.   
Hirvoja’s parish exemplifies the way in which the EOC-MP ethnically and culturally 
connects with and furthers the Russian identity within Estonia. His church has helped to 
start an Orthodox private school in Tallinn that operates with some state funding in 
addition to students’ tuition fees. Still in its early years of existence and with plans to grow 
each year, the school was created as an Estonian school option that would still preserve 
Russian culture, primarily through continued language instruction. From the start, the 
school has had instruction in Estonian and Russian, though Russian speakers receive more 
of their classes in Russian. This decision was made in an effort to keep Russian youth 
progressing in their writing skills, as many of them in Estonian schools would lose a 
significant portion of their Russian writing proficiency, simply from lack of practice. The 
school ultimately furnishes a trilingual education, teaching students in Estonian, English, 
and Russian. In addition to classes, the students attend liturgical services at Father Toomas’ 
church of St. John the Baptist once a month. This Orthodox primary school does further the 
elements of the Russian culture and ethnicity, primarily through language, but it is a good 
example of the way in which the line can be effectively straddled; though it still maintains 
distinctly Russian elements, it acknowledges and participates in Estonian society. The 
school is but one example of the way in which the church draws its strength from a cultural 
base. Rohtmets also mentioned the way in which the EOC-MP works through Russian 
cultural organizations, such as veterans groups or well-attended public celebrations, to 
recruit more parishioners. The shared Russianness forms the initial base, the impetus for 
introduction and then inclusion, showing once again that the national-cultural motivations 
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are quite strong and, in line with findings drawn from the surveys, remain the strongest 
point of connection with the church, rather than the Christian faith.  
 
3.3 Managing Russian Influence and Cultural Relationships with an 
External State 
The role of the EOC-MP among the Russian minority is difficult to deduce primarily 
because maintaining a cultural connection with one’s roots is not necessarily inimical. The 
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia reserves as a fundamental right of all people living 
in Estonia “the right to preserve his or her national identity.”115 Therefore, regardless of 
whether faith or ethnicity takes precedence, the Church’s fostering of a Russian national 
identity is technically not prohibited. Yet, Russia’s Concept of Foreign Policy claims the 
right to defend the national identity of Russians dwelling beyond its borders, harkening 
back to Brubaker’s prediction about the encroachment of external homelands towards 
ethnic communities living beyond their borders. The Russian Federation’s concern for 
Russian nationals abroad does not stop at monitoring their rights, but extends to 
“preserving the cultural and ethnic identity of the Russian diaspora and its ties with the 
historical homeland.”116 The EOC-MP’s role as a cultural institution in Estonia makes it a 
clear possible choice for extending the influence of the Russian state to the ethnic Russian 
population. This connection is generally viewed with uneasiness and suspicion by ethnic 
Estonians.  
In the same Concept of Foreign Policy, the Russian government also articulates an 
interesting definition of “soft power.” In the eyes of the Estonia’s larger next-door 
neighbor, this term originally coined by Joseph Nye, is seen as a “comprehensive toolkit 
for achieving foreign policy objectives” through means other than traditional diplomacy.117  
The document then proceeds to note how soft power has been used unfairly or unlawfully 
by countries to undermine the stability of other states and intervene in their internal affairs.  	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In believing that soft power is a tool that can be actively utilized, the Russian 
government attests to actively looking for inroads into societies outside its borders. 
However, soft power, conceptually, is not a tool to be wielded like a screwdriver or 
wrench. The toolkit that the Concept mentions aligns metaphorically more with coercion 
and military strength, rather than the persuasion and attraction of culture, values, and 
foreign policy that are inherent in the soft power approach.  Russia’s overt behavior often 
contradicts the subtle nature of soft power, the art of getting “other countries to want what 
it wants.” Nonetheless, Russia still has the potential to procure the desired soft power 
results by marketing a culture and then garnering support and loyalty for the ideology that 
comes with it.118  According to Nye, “co-optive power—getting others to want what you 
want—and soft power resources—cultural attraction, ideology, and international 
institutions—are not new.”119 Prior to the new Russia, the Soviet Union was well-practiced 
in performing this kind of persuasion through its myths, personality cults, and overarching 
communist ideology. This brief point in the overview of Russia’s approach to foreign 
policy within the modern world and the Russian political leadership’s interpretation of the 
term “soft power” sheds light on the distrust of Estonians toward the EOC-MP’s actions 
within their borders when linked with Moscow through the patriarchate. 
An institution such as a church provides a ready-made historical and cultural 
connection for the exertion of soft power.  It can supply fertile ground in which to plant 
“preferences or define [the] interests [of others] in ways consistent with its own.”120 This in 
turn opens the door for a minority group to mirror the feelings of co-nationals constituting a 
majority in an external nation-state along negative lines; “Russian homeland nationalism, 
moreover, may encourage Russian minorities to adopt more intransigent stances than they 
would have been inclined to do without support from Russia.”121 As Russia professes an 
increasingly active approach in the realm of compatriot policy and soft power influence, 
and as the ROC comes under increasing scrutiny for tightening bonds with the Kremlin 
leadership, asking whether the EOC-MP’s presence and relationship to a foreign hierarchy 	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is detrimental to Estonian society is a legitimate question. In answering this question, the 
Estonians I interviewed were characteristically dubious of the Church’s subordination to 
Moscow, with some even doubtful as to whether the EOC-MP would be aware of being 
taken advantage of.  
The Russian minority within Estonia and Russia’s own compatriot policy gives Russia 
a foothold in the small Baltic nation. It is in Russia’s best interest to maintain and even 
expand this population and continue to influence it. Mr. Eerik Jõks, Executive Secretary of 
the Estonian Council of Churches from 1994 to 2006 and Chairman of the ECC 
Theological Commission from 2011 to 2013, still strives to improve dialogue and 
coordinated growth among the Christian denominations within Estonia. He enjoys positive 
personal relationships with the clergy of multiple churches, working with them regularly. 
Yet, even he feels that the EOC-MP is one of the avenues along which Russia could 
potentially encroach on Estonia, pushing beyond simply defending the rights of ethnic 
Russians. He cited the then-recent annexation of Crimea as an example of why it “is always 
good [for Russia] to have a base” of Russian sympathizers, supporters, or nationalists. “I 
feel that the Russian Orthodox Church is playing a role in this,” meaning the continued 
existence of this base. “I don’t say that they get directions from the government, rather that 
they are used not to integrate…because when you integrate you cease to be an integral 
community with clear ethnic characteristics.”122  The insular environment of the EOC-MP 
is conducive to the exclusively Russian base that the Russian Federation hopes to maintain 
through cultural ties. However, the percentages among non-Estonian ethnic groups that 
responded to the EUU 2010 question in which they were asked to rank the importance of 
various things, one being “Estonia, present and future,” were remarkably similar to the 
percentage among Estonian respondents. The highest number of responses for all groups 
fell under the “Very important” and “Important” labels, numerically vouching for a vested 
interest among the entire population for the country they call home, regardless of 
ethnicity.123  
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Additionally, Jõks classified Orthodoxy as a church more concentrated on its 
established community, rather than one focused on mission, going out and evangelizing. I 
found support for this viewpoint in my other interviews. When asked about the activities of 
the church, its programs, and things of that nature, I was often met with little idea of what 
the Orthodox church did outside of celebrate the liturgy. As Father Toomas said, the liturgy 
is the Church’s best tool for evangelizing, which is understandable considering the 
compellingly beautiful, full sensory experience that is an Orthodox mass. Yet, even from 
the Orthodox priests, I received answers focused on their pastoral duties rather than actions 
taken by the congregation that outwardly expressed or served others through their faith. To 
doubt the existence of good deeds, service, and involvement of individual parishioners in 
social work would be foolish, but the culture of the Orthodox Church appears simply more 
inwardly focused on the church’s community itself. This quality, coupled with Russia’s 
stated desire to make political and patriotic inroads via cultural avenues, makes the 
Orthodox Church a prime community through which to further foster an insular Russian 
minority.  
 
3.4 Religion as a Tool of Political Mobilization 
The question of whether this relationship between church and culture, as well as culture 
and external homelands, leads naturally into a question of the political aspect of the 
Orthodox church’s role and the way it shapes minority conceptions of identity and 
community. In April and May of 2007, some of the most prominent Russian-Estonian 
clashes since the fall of the USSR occurred in Tallinn. They revolved around the removal 
of the Bronze Soldier statue from the center of Tallinn and its relocation to a military 
cemetery. The statue commemorated the “liberation” of Estonia from German Nazi 
occupation by Soviet forces, and over time, had become a symbol for honoring the memory 
of the Soviet soldiers who had died in the Second World War. Its removal begot massive 
riots, looting, arrests, and one fatality within the city as well as harsh criticism from the 
Kremlin and the ROC outside Estonia’s borders. The Bronze Soldier incident served as 
Estonia’s premier ethnic conflict, still referenced today and still charged with emotion, 
interest, and debate.  
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The Orthodox Church in Estonia and abroad in Russia did not stay silent during this 
conflict. Patriarch Alexy of Moscow condemned the relocation of the statue, as well as the 
bodies of the two unknown Russian soldiers who were buried by it, accusing the Estonian 
government which had commissioned the action of being irreverent to not only those who 
had given their lives in the war, but all Russians in general.124  Such sentiments echoed 
those of President Vladimir Putin and his successor, Dmitri Medvedev. The EOC-MP, 
following the path already established by its mother church in Russia, expressed its 
disappointment in the decision to relocate the statue. In a statement issued by Metropolitan 
Kornilii, a call for respect for rather than retaliation against the Soviet legacy was 
expressed, while no words were given to quell the riots or reprimand violent responses to 
this change.125  Additionally, an emphasis was placed on the frivolity of turning an 
ethnically neutral statue (a point attributed to the Soviet Union’s multiethnic composition) 
into one charged with present-day disputes. The blame fell mostly on the Estonian state for 
altering the prism through which it was seen.126  The appearance of deference to its 
Moscow mother church was strong within the EOC-MP hierarchy’s response and spoke to 
the church’s tendency to support the Russian see. Additionally, the EOC-MP’s response 
appeared more hostile to the Estonian state than to those who had broken the law, by 
charging the state with the initial act of provocation.  
The case of the Bronze Solider provides a remarkably fitting connection with the work 
of Katherine Verdery’s Political Lives of Dead Bodies. Though not an actual dead body, 
the Bronze Soldier represented and laid claim to many of the same sentiments as those 
provoked by the corpses Verdery discusses. The movement, veneration, and celebration of 
bodies allows the affected populace, as well as outside observers, to track an evolving, 
visible political process through physical change. Though the remains of two unnamed 
Soviet soldiers rested with the Bronze Soldier statue, it was odd that their relocation 
garnered little uproar or cries of injustice. Rather, it was the most visible element, central to 
the display, which caused the greatest protest. In her book, Verdery devotes her 	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introductory chapter in part to the subject of statues. She claims that statues, especially 
those sculpted to depict famous leading figures, bestow those individuals with timelessness, 
memorializing them like an icon.127  They neither decay nor vanish into obscurity. Yet, 
when toppled or removed, their humanity and mortality is once again restored, and the lofty 
ideals or victorious history that they once stood for is altered along with their presence. 
Verdery uses a startling and aptly religious wording to describe the repercussions of such 
phenomenon. “Tearing it down not only removes that specific body from the landscape, as 
if to excise it from history, but also proves that because it can be torn down, no god 
protects it.”128 I believe this fear of cultural mortality can be particularly motivating in the 
case of an ethnic minority.  
Therefore, following the line of Verdery’s reasoning, the church intersects 
meaningfully with the political in this instance. The church facilitates the lobbying for 
continued ethnic and cultural respect and unity. One of my interviewees indicated that the 
membership numbers of the EOC-MP increased following the Bronze Soldier debacle.129 
Estonia’s population censuses indicate the potential truth in this statement. Estonia’s two 
most recent censuses were conducted in 2000 and 2011. In that span of eleven years 
between the two censuses, the population of the Republic of Estonia has declined by 
approximately 62,000. In the recording and classification of ethno-cultural characteristics, 
religious affiliation was also documented. In 2000, seven years prior to the Bronze Soldier 
conflict, Estonians who declared themselves Orthodox numbered 18,577 while Russians 
were predictably higher with 104,698. In 2011, though the overall population had declined, 
both Estonian and Russian respondents indicating an affiliation with Orthodoxy had 
increased. Approximately 20,500 Estonians and 134, 270 Russians claimed Orthodox as 
their faith.130 These numbers show that despite an overall trend of decline in the population 
of Estonia, Orthodoxy is still winning over new members. As the trend indicates growing 
claims to the title, rather than an active membership, and, as my interviews indicated, 
neither Orthodox church is enthusiastically evangelizing within the community, one can 	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postulate that this increase has not necessarily been brought on by the externally-focused 
ministry of the churches, but rather a increasing need or desire to identify oneself along this 
cultural vein. These censuses did not differentiate between the two different Orthodox 
Churches, which would indeed provide an interesting comparison were that information 
available, but they do show an increased number of Orthodox in 2011, four years following 
the Bronze Soldier clash.  
Taking into account Verdery’s work on the potential of the inanimate to mirror the 
animate’s place in society, it makes sense that the Orthodox Church would grow in its 
importance as a hub of Russian identity within Estonia. As one icon (the Bronze Soldier) is 
diminished, the other (the Orthodox Church) grows with the new onus of cultural 
preservation and advocacy transferred to it. The EOC-MP, more so than the EAOC, grows 
as other elements of Russian culture in Estonia appear increasingly threatened. Verdery 
quotes Gillian Feeley-Harnik’s writing, “Ancestors are made from remembering them. 
Remembering creates a difference between the deadliness of corpses and the fruitfulness of 
ancestors.”131 The EOC-MP enables this fruitful remembrance, as evidenced from its plea 
to remember the greatness of those who fought against the Nazis regardless of their native 
language or ethnic affiliation. As Estonia grapples with how to process and 
compartmentalize Soviet and post-Soviet identities and memories, the Bronze Solider being 
but one example, the EOC-MP can provide a legitimate institution through which ethnic 
Russians can band together and act politically. This draw to Orthodoxy over a period of 
years in which Russians and Estonians particularly clashed shows once again that the 
church’s membership is not solely dictated by belief alone and that the label of Orthodoxy 
does not just denote a faith identity, but one’s loyalties and ethnicity as well.  
Following the Bronze Soldier incident, Estonia’s Centre Party (Keskerakond) began to 
emerge as an increasingly Russian-friendly political party and it too began to overlap with 
the Orthodox Church due to this outlook. The number of its supporters dipped during and 
immediately following the protests and riots, mostly due to the party’s support for Russian 
opinions in this conflict and the resulting departure of former supporters who were of 
Estonian ancestry. However, numbers rebounded for the party as it became closely linked 	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with fighting for fairness and rights for all groups, though the Russian minority is typically 
the group on whose behalf they advocate.132  Following the Bronze Soldier events, the 
Centre Party’s reputation as the “Russian-sympathetic” or “Russian-supported” political 
party has grown. Estonia allows even non-citizens to vote in local elections, allowing the 
Russian population to indeed express its support for what has become labeled as “their” 
party. The integration survey analysis from 2011 found that while ethnic Estonian voting is 
spread among all parties, Russian votes tend to either go to the Centre Party or do not get 
cast at all.133 Due in part to the large ethnic Russian population in the capital city of 
Tallinn, the mayor of Tallinn, Edgar Savisaar, who was most recently reconfirmed in his 
position in November of 2013, is a member of the Centre Party. In recent years, the party 
has furthered its negative reputation among Estonians for serving Russian interests by 
taking funding from Russian companies and cooperating with United Russia, Putin’s own 
political party.134  These links with Russian-centered causes, conflicts and groups over the 
years have cemented its controversial image as the Russian choice in Estonia, drawing 
consistent Russian support whether or not the issues it addresses impact that sector of the 
population.  
The intersection of the political and the religious is evident in Patriarch Kirill’s most 
recent visit to Estonia in June of 2013. Upon arriving, his first stops were to visit some of 
the most politically significant sites in Tallinn before meeting with Mayor Savisaar. The 
Alexander Nevsky cathedral, an architecturally traditional Russian Orthodox structure that 
belongs not to the EOC-MP, but the ROC, was the first destination, followed by the Bronze 
Soldier in its new location within the military cemetery. The impetus for the visit was a 
commemoration of the reinstatement of the tomes, given by Patriarch Alexy, to the EOC-
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MP prior to the schism, by which its autonomy was restored.135  Later on in his two-day 
visit, Patriarch Kirill went to the Lasnamäe district of Tallinn, the most populated Russian 
district of the capital, to bless the newly-constructed Orthodox church there. Earlier in 
2012, this same church had unveiled a bust of the late Patriarch Alexy in the surrounding 
courtyard of the church. Verdery’s argument can also be applied here. With the 
memorializing of this figure, Alexy is enlivened once more within the community, the 
connection between Tallinn and Moscow strengthened, standing as a daily reminder of 
Alexy’s shared Estonian and Russian identity that one could potentially imitate through the 
EOC-MP. Its dedication was attended by Savisaar who spoke of Alexy as “our outstanding 
fellow-countryman,” a verbal recognition of Alexy’s years spent living and serving in 
Estonia.136 Patriarch Alexy undoubtedly did much for Orthodoxy in Soviet-era Estonia and 
post-communist Russia, saving church buildings, defending the faith, and helping to create 
a new civil society in which religion was accepted after the fall of communism.137  
However, these examples all show the close link to Russia, not just through the shared 
Orthodox faith but the strong political and cultural connections as well. It is the consistent 
reminder of these bonds through visits and memorials that many Estonians view as 
threatening, as something more present and potent than just a shared history.  
The aforementioned church in Lasnamäe has proved to be a site that has stirred up 
strong sentiments of identity among Russians in Estonia, though in a less explosive manner 
than the Bronze Soldier monument. The district itself is known for its sizeable Russian 
population and typically forms a reliable foundation of support for Savisaar and his Centre 
Party. During Estonia’s famous Singing Revolution, one of the most popular songs 
contained a call to “stop Lasnamäe!,” illustrating how even then this neighborhood of 
Tallinn was equated to a strong Russian presence and the potential threats that Estonian 	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patriots believed came with it.138 But, the construction of an Orthodox church in this 
district was a sensible decision, considering the large number of Russian residents. During 
the initial start of the building in 2003, the feelings towards the Lasnamäe church were not 
as strongly divisive as they were often been portrayed in more recent years. Rather, as 
Estonia ascended to EU membership, the nation appeared to exercise a more relaxed view 
towards this new church, whose cornerstone was laid by Patriarch Alexy, and the minority 
it would serve.139   
However, the construction of the religious building has since been the site of political 
disputes, especially during periods of electoral tension. Though the church remained a 
constant, attitudes towards it fluctuated under the pressure of politics and scandal. 
Throughout the long building process, the funding for the church was often called into 
question or criticized. It is reported that in 2010 alone, the Moscow Patriarchate gave 1.24 
million Euros to the construction of this church.140 Savisaar’s official visits to Moscow to 
discuss funding for the project with his business connections also drew criticism from the 
Estonian press which questioned his loyalty and whether the project was more in line with 
the needs of Estonia or the desires of neighboring Russia. Although the mayor claimed that 
donations from individuals within Estonia were increasing and funding a significant portion 
of the project (which simultaneously served as validation that the church was not solely a 
Moscow pursuit), his own past association with illegal monetary contributions from Russia 
cast doubt on his word.141  Much of the money coming from the Moscow Patriarchate was 
linked with Savisaar’s lucrative business contacts such as Vladimir Yakunin, a Russian 
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railroad tycoon and close associate of Putin.142 Additionally, Savisaar’s overall enthusiastic 
support for the Lasnamäe church’s construction caused Estonians to question whether he 
was following in the footsteps of old Russian czars who sought “political loyalty and 
support among ethno-religious minorities” via similar acts.143 Articles regarding the 
Lasnamäe church throughout its construction process never failed to point to at least one of 
the following: a connection to Russia, the ethnic Russian minority population, or Savisaar 
and his own questionable political past. These were inescapable elements of any press 
report regarding this particular church and show the prejudice and uneasiness that the press 
and possibly Estonians as a whole feel towards this church, fearing it as a means to further 
tie Russian residents to an external homeland.  
An interesting facet of the Lasnamäe development surfaced in an interview with a priest 
from the EOC-MP.  He had also noticed the critical reporting over the years of the church’s 
construction. Yet, the people of the district and Russians throughout Estonia continued to 
support its construction, both verbally and financially. Thousands attended the blessing of 
the church by Patriarch Kirill in 2013 and thousands also attended the dedication of 
Patriarch Alexy’s bust, many coming forward to revere the bust with clearly emotional 
countenances.  These heartfelt displays and unflagging support are a testament, the priest 
said, to how the Russians living in Estonia view their church. “The church is not just a 
religious institution, but it is a symbol, a symbol of human dignity.”144 The building and 
completion of the Lasnamäe church was an example, a symbol through which this human 
dignity was realized. The tone and gravity with which the priest spoke of this church’s 
completion sounded as if he equated its construction to that of a victory. For the EOC-MP 
community, the church had become a microcosm of the “us-vs.-them” conflict, dividing the 
ethnic Russians from the larger Estonian society. By phrasing it as a victory for human 
dignity, the Russian community takes on the role of the oppressed and the Estonian 
majority as the oppressor.  	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The Lasnamäe church became more than simply a church, morphing into a political 
statement on identity and membership within Estonian society. In turn, during my own 
visits to Orthodox services while in Tallinn, I noticed that the churches themselves were 
never particularly full. Attendants were often older Russian women, providing further proof 
to the adage that the Orthodox Church is kept alive by faithful grandmothers. Participants 
would duck in and out, rarely staying for the entire service. What I observed further attests 
to the strength of the cultural Orthodox element over resounding faith. The multitude of 
people who flock to these religious dedications and support the building of new churches 
within Estonia shows that these structures themselves become symbols and tools in the 
battle to uphold the minority’s Russian identity. Their construction is politicized, but once 
completed, the fervor with which they were previously supported does not translate into 
continued devotion and frequent visits. Listening to the priest talk about the Lasnamäe 
church, I perceived a sense of community among Russians, cultivated through the shared 
Orthodox faith, but with a component that was directly oppositional to the Estonians. 
Juxtaposed with these remarks are those of an Estonian interviewee, who questioned 
whether there was any conscious presence of human dignity within the EOC-MP at all, 
especially with its connection to the ROC. “Look at the statistics that indicate any kind of 
moral issues,” he said, “and you will get really horrified. Because you say, if everyone is a 
member of this church, how can this be that a country [referring to Russia] is as corrupted 
as it is.145 It is this stereotype that the EOC-MP must battle against due to its connection 
with Russia, and that connection is the very reason why many of their more visible actions 
launch the church into a politicized realm, mirroring the highly polarized divide between 
Estonia’s two main nationalities, rather than one of discussion, mutual acknowledgement, 
and acceptance.  
Dividing the religious from the political in the case of the Orthodox Church is a 
difficult task. Often, the ambitions and desires of the EOC-MP are compatible with those of 
the Russian state, whether or not in reality such synergy exists. In the words of an EAOC 
priest, “the Moscow Patriarchate doesn’t realize that Estonia’s a free country. Or they don’t 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Interview A, June 2, 2014.  
	   62	  
want to realize that one area.”146 His statement perhaps sounds prejudiced, a product of his 
own negative judgment of a competing church, but he is not alone. Two Estonian political 
scientists, Piret Ehin and Andres Kasekamp, believe that the early Russian administrations 
of Yeltsin and Putin operated with the aim of restoring regional hegemony in the area that 
was once the Soviet Union.147 The commitment and the cultivation of deeper cooperation 
with the ROC “suggest that the Church and [Putin] share a political culture that makes 
them challenge the independence of the countries that were under Moscow’s control until 
1991.”148 The EOC-MP thus becomes a suspect institution for many Estonians, which only 
perpetuates the societal and political division.  
The politicized nature of the ROC in turn lends a more political character to its 
subordinate church in Estonia. Ringo Ringvee noted that though the first message of the 
Moscow Patriarchate’s official visits to Estonia is typically one of goodwill and a 
reiteration of its respect for or connection to the country, it is typically followed by one 
which effectively states “that the historical injustice [referring to the property contestation] 
should be managed.”149 The process is a slow moving one and therefore can be expected to 
be a central factor in the relationship and approach of these churches continuing forward. 
Father Toomas humorously remarked at the speed with which the Orthodox churches 
move, pointing to how only recently relations with the Catholic Church have become more 
brotherly and open.150 So too in 2010 did the ROC’s Department for External Church 
Relations chairman, Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk, make reference to the Estonian 
property disputes in a press conference. While the Metropolitan stated that the ROC was 
happy with the progress that the 2002 resolution brought to the situation, eight years later, 
the same overarching property problem remains.151  
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A recent article in the World Affairs Journal looking at the state of Russians in Estonia 
constructed a clear link between the flagging enthusiasm for democracy, the rise of Putin, 
and the growing enthusiasm for the Orthodox Church, both in Russia and the near abroad. 
As Russia becomes more isolated on the world stage, more Russians have taken to 
displaying religious elements of Russian culture, sporting cross necklaces and St. George 
ribbons, visible declarations of their heritage, pride, and support for the church and its state. 
“By itself, there is nothing wrong with such religious beliefs and practices, but in the 
context of Russia, where the church has for ages been a political instrument of state power, 
religious expression is often fundamentalist and exclusionary.”152 In light of this, however, 
it is only fair to note that the EAOC certainly has its share of politically mobilizing 
moments. Though it is currently on the preferable side of the property dispute, the 
reinstatement of the church itself is a reflection of the political climate of that time. As 
Estonia was moving towards independence, the appeal of expressing cultural pride through 
religious means grew among Estonians who claimed Orthodoxy. National independence 
led to cries for church autonomy and a greater desire to manage the Estonian churches by 
Estonians.153 For many, the reasoning was simple: it was an easier task to become a more 
independently Estonian church under the Ecumenical Patriarch than under the Moscow 
Patriarchate, considering the historical and political divisions at the time.154 During the 
independence movement, the churches were already politicized and have only remained so.  
The EOC-MP definitely serves the interests of the Russians who comprise its 
congregations. Its intersection with the political sphere is clear through its support from 
Estonia’s Centre Party as well as its willingness to follow the policy line of its mother 
church, the ROC. Due to its high Russian composition, the church is one of the main 
advocates for the Russian minority in Estonia, in addition to being an institution that helps 
to preserve that particular identity and cultural awareness. This manifests itself politically 
due to Russia’s own pledge to employ the “tool” of soft power through the maintenance of 
Russian heritage and language worldwide. Additionally, the EOC-MP appears to be a 	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legitimizing institution for the Russian minority. Orthodoxy’s strong presence in Estonia 
and the surrounding region give Russians an institution around which to rally. They 
mutually reinforce each other—the church speaks on behalf of the minority that it serves 
and so the minority flocks to it, seeking its guidance, community, and defense during times 
of political division or disruption.  
 
3.5  Integration 
It is believed that churches can assist in the integration effort, particularly through 
cultivating an environment that is open to fraternal cooperation while still maintaining a 
strong sense of cultural identity. However, this study’s interviewees expressed their doubts 
over churches’ actual ability to assist in integration measures. Take for example Ringo 
Ringvee’s view:  
“It’s kind of a slogan often for religious communities or associations to 
[say] they help integration. But it seems that, and this doesn’t only apply 
to the Moscow Patriarchate or the Orthodox Church of the Moscow 
Patriarchate here [in Estonia], but it seems that these associations, or 
these religious organizations that have a very close connection to the 
ethnic identity, they are more interested in keeping this ethnic identity 
than in integrating these people into the rest of society. I think this has 
nothing to do with Estonia, but in many ways it’s politically correct for 
religious communities to help integrate, but it seems that much more 
helpful for integration are those religious associations that are 
international and global.”155 
 
Working within the Ministry of the Interior, he sees the constant competition for 
superiority between ethnic identity and overall integration. This assumption that religion 
aids integration is, in his opinion, a “naïve” one. Another interviewee working for an 
ecumenical organization shared a similar opinion. In regards to the EOC-MP, he sees the 
link between the church and Russia as too strong, occupying the primary role, leaving 
allegiance to Estonia a secondary priority. Not only does the Russian government have a 
stake in the matter, considering the EOC-MP’s close relationship with its mother church, 
but the ROC too has its own aims for the EOC-MP; it seeks a strong relationship in hopes 
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of maintaining its position as largest Orthodox church on the European continent. In order 
to maintain this dominance—and the numbers and support that fuel it—members must 
remain un-integrated. When someone is integrated they begin seeking out answers that the 
ROC and Russia may not prefer to answer. Both arrived at a shared question: Can the 
Church even have a noticeable role in integration and shaping the political and cultural 
identities of this minority, when so few of individuals pass through the church’s doors each 
week? 
Based upon the integration plans of Estonia and the themes that arose most often 
through my own interviews and research, I’ve identified four areas into which elements of 
this integration discussion and the church’s overlapping role or impact are noteworthy: 
culture, language, history, and definition debates (integration versus assimilation versus 
segregation). By briefly investigating the way in which Orthodoxy affects each of these 
facets, I not only hope to provide a more detailed look at part of a larger issue, but also 
discern an answer to one of this thesis’ key questions: whether the church helps or hinders 
its minority members in integration pursuits.  
 
3.5.1 Culture 
The multitude of people present at public Orthodox celebrations or church dedications, 
such as in Lasnamäe, is a testament to the strength of the cultural side of the Orthodox 
Church and its prevailing strength over actual faith. The stark contrast between these more 
public organized gatherings and the typical Sunday liturgy crowd give the impression of a 
culture of belonging, rather than believing. In the case of the EOC-MP, times when such 
great numbers are gathered are viewed in the press as events synonymous with Russian 
solidarity and assertion of one’s ethnic heritage. While many Orthodox believers and 
outsiders alike link ethnicity and faith as a package deal, this connection is one that many 
priests in the EOC-MP are seeking to battle. The perception that the EOC-MP is a Russian 
church, a foreign church, often perceived as similar to a squatter on Estonian soil, is 
detrimental to the church’s reputation as a whole and its ability to positively affect 
integration among its parishioners. Father Toomas assured me that he did not feel as though 
he was in a Russian church, when asked what it was like to be an Estonian in the EOC-MP. 
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He inserted a gentle reminder of the EOC-MP’s autonomous status, but also assured me 
that he sees the EOC-MP as Estonian. “It’s the local church, and it’s not important which 
ethnos or which language we have. Nowadays, the world is open…and so for me, the 
ethnic is not the most important thing. For me, it’s…[about being] more close to Christ.”156  
Father Sarapik, a priest within the EAOC, voiced similar sentiments. An acceptance of this 
viewpoint shared by these two clergymen on a grand sclae, over that of the ethnicity-
centered one that predominates in public opinion, would be beneficial to both Orthodox 
churches in Estonia and their mutual relations.  
Another component of the cultural aspect of integration relates to how Estonian culture 
is marketed or presented to those who are not ethnically Estonian. Due to Estonia’s long 
history of external domination, Estonian culture has existed much longer than the actual 
Estonian republic. Typically centered on the incredibly unique Estonian language, Estonian 
identity leans heavily on the ethno-linguistic aspects of its culture over those of a state or 
republican identity. One interviewee called for a purposeful shift towards a state-based 
culture to improve the progress of integration. Such a change would stress the statehood of 
Estonia, while allowing ethnic groups to keep the elements of their culture alive and not 
feel like their language and customs are in direct competition with Estonian culture and 
language, as they often do at present.157 The Integration Monitoring Summary confirms this 
view. In a day and age when minorities, especially those of the younger demographic, feel 
more empowered to speak up and protest, education in Estonian that then focuses on 
simply memorizing “terms and themes” significant to Estonian history and national identity 
“might become perfunctory and give rise to protest and distrust among pupils.”158  Instead, 
education about the Estonian republic should focus on cultivating dialogue among citizens 
in the languages that they are best able to express themselves, and take into consideration 
the critical perspectives non-integrated or partially integrated members of society may 
have. The integration study refers to this as “civic education” and considering that the 
Church is often looked to as a cultivator of civil society, the secular and religious interests 
intersect here.  	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Since the EOC-MP lays claim to the majority of Orthodox believers of Russian 
heritage, it has the opportunity to create a positive middle-ground of Estonian and Russian 
culture. Integration evaluations claim that consideration should be given to how Estonian 
culture and language are presented to semi or un-integrated Russians, as many of them, 
“due to limited contacts with ethnic Estonians, lack of trust, narrow educational attitudes 
and Russian-oriented media preferences” may have negative impressions of Estonian 
culture and the prospect of integration.159 If the EOC-MP were to truly embrace its status as 
a local church and encourage its Russian parishioners in both Estonian and Russian cultural 
pursuits, its role in integration could be improved. Much relies on the Moscow Patriarchate 
as well, in addition to the local EOC-MP churches. The EAOC’s Ecumenical Patriarch 
recently canonized eleven Estonian saints in 2012, all of whom had been martyred during 
the period of Soviet occupation.160 The ROC has numerous Estonian saints and has been 
adding to its registry new martyrs who were condemned to death by the communist regime. 
However, the Ecumenical Patriarch’s canonization of eleven Estonians speaks to his 
heightened awareness of the importance of acknowledging Estonian culture in comparison 
to the Moscow Patriarch’s. Acknowledgment, respect and alignment with Estonia as a state 
and its civic culture would greatly benefit the ROC and the EOC-MP in opening the door to 
a more cordial relationship with ethnic Estonians.  
 
3.5.2 History 
Any reticence that the EOC-MP may have in assisting the integration agenda of the 
Estonian state generally comes from its continuing status as a tenant church. All of my 
accumulated evidence drawn from personal interviews, public statements made by the 
ROC or EOC-MP regarding the church’s status in Estonia, and existing scholarship on the 
Orthodox Church in Estonia acknowledges the property disputes of the 1990s and early 
2000s and emphasizes their continuing influence on the way the church views the state, 
Russians, and the Estonian government. At present, according to the agreement made in 	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160 Estonian Public Broadcasting, “Orthodox Church Canonizes 11 Estonian Martyrs,” May 17, 2012, 
accessed September 22, 2014, http://news.err.ee/v/culture/07cc3831-4d86-40ad-be5e-ced39487b14d  It is 
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2002, the EOC-MP rents their church buildings from the state. This arrangement maintains 
a sense of bitterness, serving as a reminder of the past and subjecting the EOC-MP to a 
secondary status among the Orthodox churches in Estonia. This stipulation regarding 
property ownership is not objectionable due to high rents from the state, which are low and 
are intended to keep the EAOC from regulating the rent of a church that it refuses to 
acknowledge in principle. Instead, the primary annoyance is in the fact that the EOC-MP 
cannot rent and manage its own properties, lands, and assets. In comparison to the EAOC, 
which acquired the property of all 80 church parishes that existed in Estonia after 
independence, the EOC-MP has limited resources with which to create income for the 
church.161  
An Orthodox priest of the EOC-MP spoke about how a church’s new school facilities 
had to be rented first from the Roman Catholic Church and then, the following year, from 
an entirely new group with a larger building. Changing locations every year is a less than 
ideal situation, but is mandated by the fact that the church lacks the necessary facilities on 
its own. The weight of this decision to restitute property solely to the EAOC cultivates a 
sense of frustration among the EOC-MP clergy and laity. The same priest mentioned his 
church’s desire to set up a translation house for Orthodox literature before quickly 
acknowledging the unlikelihood of this endeavor ever happening considering the church’s 
financial standing. Other churches benefit from their land holdings, not simply just from 
the buildings that they can rent. They are also able to profit from harvesting the land’s 
natural materials.162 EOC-MP churches depend primarily on the small amount of funding 
siphoned through to members of the ECC and the donations they gain from candle 
purchases and church tithing. This has been the state of affairs since the early 1990s. 
Though recent, this detrimental chapter from the history of the new Estonian republic 
remains highly symbolic and present in the minds of Russian Orthodox living in Estonia.  
History affects both sides of this memory. Not only does the EAOC cite the institution 
of the Stockholm Synod as the rightful continuation of its church, a point that has never 
been canonically recognized by the ROC or EOC-MP, but it also holds fast to a belief that 	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the ROC aided the Soviet state’s russification efforts. Geographer Dimitrii Sidorov looked 
into this claim by evaluating the primary languages of churches that were closed during the 
Soviet occupation years of 1944 to the 1960s. During that period, 62 churches were closed 
and of them 57 were Estonian-speaking.163 In my interview with a priest of the Moscow 
Patriarchate-affiliated church, he acknowledged the shift from a strong Estonian Orthodox 
base to a primarily Russian one once the Soviet occupation set in. “Some Soviet people 
came…and some families of the military men, some from the working class, to build the 
factories and new districts. Some of them were religious people from the Soviet Union and 
they started to join the congregations and…Estonians started to fade away.”164 Eventually, 
the demographic of the congregations dictated a shift from an Estonian language to a 
primarily Russian one. Though the former ROC Patriarch, Alexy II, championed the church 
as a main protector of Estonian Orthodoxy, Sidorov’s findings and the decline in Estonian 
participation have led scholars to conclude that the Orthodox faithful in Estonia whom the 
ROC was most intent to protect were those of Russian descent. Richters elaborates that 
such an interpretation not only acts as evidence of Alexy’s decision to use “his authority to 
advance the communist policy of russifying the non-Russian republics,” but that “ethnic 
Estonians abandoned the ROC after World War II because they perceived it as an ally of 
the occupiers.”165  
Estonia’s implementation strategy for the state integration plan of 2011-2013 lists 
among its general priorities the development of citizens’ associations “in order to increase 
the participation of people whose mother tongue is other than Estonian in the civil society; 
in order to involve people whose mother tongue is other than Estonian more efficiently in 
social life.”166  The Orthodox churches in Estonia have great potential to take on that role, 
cultivating cross-cultural fraternal relationships beginning with the churches themselves, 
taking advantage of their status as being the largest denomination (when combined) within 
Estonian Christianity. However, their historical disputes that still remain largely unresolved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Dmitrii Sidorov, Orthodoxy and Difference: Essays on the Geography of Russian Orthodox Church(es) in 
the 20th Century (San Jose: Pickwick Publications, 2001), 132. 
164 Archpriest Toomas Hirvoja, in interview with author, June 6, 2014.	  
165 Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture and Greater Russia, 79.  
166 Estonian Integration Strategy 2008-2013, Implementation Plan for 2011-2013, 5.  
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appear to be the greatest obstacle standing in their way in the pursuit of such potentially 
fruitful integrative measures. The inability to escape mention of the property disputes in 
any conversation related to Orthodoxy in Estonia is a testament to the necessity of the 
repair and resolution of this matter in order to rid those loyal to the EAOC of their view of 
the EOC-MP as an occupation church and the EOC-MP from viewing the EAOC as an un-
Christian vindictive landholder. As one of my interviewees put it, the cycle of ignoring and 
refusing to recognize one another could continue on indefinitely; “if somebody is not 
saying to you ‘hello,’ you don’t need to say ‘hello’ back.”167 
 
3.5.3 Integration vs. Assimilation vs. Segregation 
While the churches could help to integrate non-Estonian speaking members into 
society, the EOC-MP’s branding as an outside church prevents it from being an effective 
institution for such ends. Rather, the debate between the two Orthodox Churches is reduced 
to whether the EOC-MP will assimilate with the set expectations of the Estonian state and 
majority, which comes with the expectation of a renouncement of property claims and any 
connection with Russia, or to be segregated from Estonian culture and civil society, further 
instilling its reputation of a solely Russian institution, instead of an Estonian one that is 
autonomous from the Moscow Patriarchate in Russia. For obvious reasons, both sides are 
unrelenting in their view on this issue and stand resolute, preventing any compromise so 
far. This conflict between the churches appears to foster the attitude that integration 
planners have cautioned against—the fulfillment and reinforcement of negative stereotypes 
of ethnic Estonians in the eyes of non-Estonian youth that their older generations may be 
fostering at home.  
The tensions and contradictions between integration, assimilation and segregation were 
addressed directly by an Orthodox priest in one of my interviews. Having served in the 
EOC-MP diocese, and neither Estonian nor Russian by birth, he thwarted my question 
regarding the Church’s role in integration by dismissing the option of integration 
immediately. The word was of no import. It had no bearing on the reality of the present 
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circumstances because it was not an honest goal or consideration in the state’s agenda.168 
To be integrated means to bring into equal participation, to merge two groups into a single 
membership. In this situation, he believed that the Estonian state expected an overblown 
confession and apology by the EOC-MP, a self-declaration to have been an instrument of 
Soviet influence and occupation, one that it would never provide due to pride, culture, or 
canonical principle. As a result of its unwillingness to accept this interpretation of its past, 
the EOC-MP has therefore been segregated from society. Although included in the ECC, its 
secondary status to the EAOC outside of the Council resulting from defeats suffered in the 
post-Soviet name registration battle and property redistribution have left its faithful feeling 
as if they were unwanted outsiders in Estonia. The accusations of being more loyal to 
Moscow than to Estonia have resulted in cultural and political resentments and defensive 
nationalism. 
In a follow-up interview with another subject, with my interest piqued by this new 
perspective, I followed the initial question on the integration-aiding measures of the 
churches with this commentary, hoping to solicit a response to the theory that integration is 
not a true option for Orthodox Russians in Estonia. The interviewee, though not a member 
of either Orthodox community or a clergyman of any other denomination, bristled at the 
question. Next, he cautioned me against those who would rephrase the issue in such terms, 
indicating that their intentions were most likely deceptive.169 I found this advice interesting 
and thought-provoking, though I could not entirely agree. Each side certainly feels attacked 
by the other, but it is precisely this refusal to acknowledge the other’s perspective, to 
suspect ulterior motives in all their words, that has prevented each church and those 
committed to them from moving forward over the past decade. In turn, by refusing to 
address the pressure Russians and its members in the EOC-MP may feel to adapt their 
narrative and identity to the interests of the Estonian state, new generations of individuals 
reticent to genuine integration are being formed.  
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3.5.4 Language 
The main debate underlying all integration discourse in Estonia revolves around the 
issue of language. Much scholarship has been devoted to the politics of language in small 
states seeking to assert their national identity. Recently, Estonia’s particular situation has 
gained increased media attention due to the Russian annexation of Crimea and support of 
Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. Putin’s use of the treatment of Russians living in 
Ukraine as one of his key justifications for involvement struck Estonia as especially 
threatening, having heard similar arguments for strong compatriot abroad policy in Estonia 
and calls for the lessening of Estonian state requirements on non-Estonian citizens and 
aliens. Language policy has garnered the bulk of the attention as the Kremlin has spoken 
out about a perceived attack on the Russian language, particularly in the schools. The Basic 
Schools and Upper Secondary Schools Act was approved in 1993 by the Estonian state and 
began the process of transitioning all state-funded public schools towards a 60% minimum 
of Estonian instruction. The remaining percentage can be taught in whatever target 
language the school prefers.170 Transition planning began in 1997 and actual transition 
began ten years later, with hopes of full integration forecasted for approximately four years 
down the road. Due to the state-funded nature of these public schools and the need to 
enforce this act, the National Language Inspectorate has taken to testing teachers and other 
employees of the state on their Estonian language skills. The testing and monitoring is 
within the rights of the state and its laws, but has given rise to hostile criticism whose 
representatives argue that the state’s action is discriminatory in nature, particularly because 
of the corresponding ability of those inspectors to deem teachers and other state employees 
unqualified for their jobs and force their termination.171 At the same time however, it seems 
improbable that teachers whose own linguistic capabilities are below those of the standards 	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they are supposed to impart to their students can fulfill their teaching responsibilities.172 In 
places such as the city of Narva, a predominantly Russian-language centered community on 
the eastern border of Estonia, the work of such inspectors and the prescriptions of the Act 
are perceived as discriminatory against the Russian language, and by default, the Russian 
culture.173  
In the language debate, many of the previously mentioned themes come to a head. The 
text of the Basic School and Upper Secondary Schools Act’s text speaks to the tension 
between a national culture based on ethnic/cultural criteria, such as language, and a state-
based culture. It states that these schools help to socialize “a new generation…based on the 
traditions of Estonian culture, common European values, and the recognition of the main 
achievements of world culture.” The anticipated end result is greater integration and 
contribution to Estonian society.174  Although these are the stated aims, the backlash 
against this act by the Russian minority indicates that the theme of integration by way of 
language is seen as an attack on its own Russian cultural identity. This is probably because 
of the unique cultural circumstances that the Russian minority finds itself in. One 
interviewee articulated an opinion that the minority was not fully Russian, but not Estonian 
either. “Who are they? That’s the question,” he proclaimed.175 Indeed it is a large and 
looming question that this thesis cannot possibly answer, but the passion with which 
language debates have proceeded in Estonia show us that language is not only at the root of 
Estonian cultural identity, but Russian as well.  
The interplay of assimilation, integration, and segregation also echoes in the language 
debates. The Russian minority perceives the state’s moves towards increased Estonian 
language instruction, even in predominantly Russian-speaking schools, to be a forced 
assimilation policy rather than one of acceptance and integration. The proposals to cast 
Russian as a second national language are often seen as a fairer approach to integration by 
that minority, while Estonians balk at the suggestion. To be expected to speak the state’s 	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official language is not a requirement that typically provokes resistance. In a New York 
Times article, Ilmar Tomusk, the director of the Inspectorate, stated it plainly: “For a 
democratic society, it is quite common that public servants should know the state language. 
If a public official is in Russia, he must know the Russian language. If he is in Estonia, he 
must know Estonian. There is no discrimination.”176 However, Estonia’s tumultuous 
history with its large neighbor to the east negates normality in the process of integration.  
The Orthodox churches find themselves at play in the debate about the role of language 
in integration. During the Soviet era, as Estonians faded away from the Orthodox churches, 
the language of the inter-church communication began to shift from Estonian to Russian, 
though it is worth noting that all churches under the Moscow Patriarchate perform their 
liturgies in Church Slavonic. The trend continues until today with most EAOC churches 
communicating their homilies and announcements in Estonian while EOC-MP primarily 
conducts theirs in Russian or Church Slavonic. While taking part in an EOC-MP service, I 
observed token instances of Estonian being used: during the Lord’s Prayer and for some 
prayers of intentions. However, most services are conducted in the language that best 
serves the congregation and in the case of the EOC-MP, that is typically Russian. Just as 
the historical property disputes mostly resonate in the higher levels of church and state 
hierarchy, so too do the language conflicts in the church originate with the leaders of the 
institutions.  
News from Russia is often condemned by ethnic Estonians as propaganda disguised as 
news, taking advantage of its consumers’ failure to linguistically integrate and tap into the 
Estonian media outlets. Such arguments are typically phrased as furthering ethnic 
Russians’ reluctance to learn the language, thus keeping them dependent on Russian 
sources, which then abuse their influence. The same charge is often levied against the 
leaders of the EOC-MP, particularly Metropolitan Kornilii. In June 2014, shortly after I 
conducted my interviews, the Metropolitan celebrated his 90th birthday. Kornilii has 
ministered to the Orthodox flock in Estonia for nearly half a century, and though the son of 
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a Russian officer, was born and raised in Tallinn.177 Kornilii was arrested by the KGB and 
imprisoned for religious materials and speech, making his way back to Estonia after 
“rehabilitation” from his labor camp experience.178 His personal history is a reminder of 
what many EOC-MP priests call on Estonians to remember, that regardless of ethnicity, the 
church as a whole suffered under Soviet rule. Like his predecessor, Alexy, Kornilii is 
known for speaking Estonian well. Yet, he continues to draw criticism for his failure to 
ardently encourage the priests within his diocese to learn the language of the country in 
which they are serving. “I never heard him say to his public, to Russians, to learn Estonian. 
That should be something quite elementary,” remarked one of my interviewees.179  I 
received a conflicting point of view from a priest within the EOC-MP, who claimed that 
though the learning of Estonian was not externally proclaimed, it was an issue that the 
Metropolitan addressed internally among his priests. Accordingly, Kornilii is very much 
focused on the local church aspect, having been born, raised, educated, and ordained as a 
priest within Estonia himself. He encourages Russian-speaking priests to learn Estonian, 
but leaves it to them ultimately to decide. Within the church, there is no official mandate 
about language. One priest observed that those who do not learn Estonian could very well 
be comfortable with a Russian-only community and congregation, as he put it, a “Russian 
ghetto.” While the Metropolitan gives the freedom to his clergy to make that choice, if 
priests prefer to have a greater “moral influence, spiritual influence on society” they must 
try to integrate and encourage their congregations along the same path.180  
Language is the gateway into integration, both for the church and the state. The lack of 
consistently strong emphasis that the EOC-MP places on Estonian language acquisition 
hurts its efforts to cultivate a reputation as a truly Estonian-minded church as well as an 
effective tool towards positive integration. The Metropolitan’s personal connection and 
affection for Estonia is an asset to the church, but would be better utilized in formal calls to 
his clergymen and congregations to take strides toward a more bilingual existence in the 	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name of better relations between Estonia’s two main nationalities. The EOC-MP’s 
inactivity in this regard and the freedom of Russian priests to decline such invitations for 
integration actively support the claims by the church’s critics that it fosters Russian identity 
at the expense of civic Estonian identity and forestalls integrative processes.  
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4. Conclusion 
 Estonia’s Russian minority has been a group around which debate and tension have 
swirled for decades. Typically, minority issues in Estonia have concentrated on education, 
language, and citizenship policy. However, this thesis sought to discern whether religion, 
particularly Orthodoxy, also had a role as a platform on which a minority could build 
community and rally behind a shared identity. Despite the small Baltic state’s popular 
image as an overwhelmingly non-religious country, my research indicates that the 
Orthodox churches do indeed serve to foster community and a sense of identity, and not 
necessarily just for those who actively take part in their liturgies and programs. Following 
the trends of polls in Russia, the numbers of those who identify with Orthodoxy in Estonia 
outweigh those who are actually active, showing that the same principle of belonging plays 
a significant role in identity, regardless of belief.  
 In examining how the Orthodox churches facilitate or hinder integration, it appears that 
though the main debates over integration policy can also be found within the churches, the 
EOC-MP does not necessarily help towards meeting the end goals of that policy. The issue 
of language within the church is the foremost reason. Language skills play an essential role 
in acquiring citizenship and melding with Estonian society. The EOC-MP primarily 
conducts its communications, and programs in Russian. Considering that its followers are 
mainly Russian speakers, this is understandable. However, the failure of the church 
hierarchy in Estonia to set standards for integrative measures and increased involvement 
that goes beyond its service to the minority population in the end promotes complacency 
regarding an issue that the Estonian political leadership sees as one of high priority and 
urgency. The insular nature of Orthodoxy, as the liturgy-centered community that it is, has 
the potential to contribute to reluctance by members to reach out beyond the Russian ethnic 
community. As all sources, surveys, and interviewees noted, the composition of the two 
Orthodox churches in Estonia is by no means homogeneous. However, the presence of 
Estonians in the EOC-MP and Russians in the EAOC is primarily dictated by necessity—
which parish serves in their locale—and such crossover is assumed to be in the minority by 
experts, in the absence of detailed ethnic surveys of each church’s membership.  
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 In interviews, individuals connected with the EOC-MP emphasized how long 
Orthodoxy had been present in Estonia and the positive and powerful historical role that it 
had played over the centuries throughout Central and Eastern Europe. These numerous 
references not only indicate the pride they have in their faith’s longevity, but the power of 
religion to unite people through a collective cultural heritage over time, a true lineage of 
belief. Herveiu-Leger’s concept of religion as a chain of memory is strongly present in the 
EOC-MP faith community. There does not appear to be a sizeable or strong niche 
community created around the churches, due to the high degree of inactivity among 
members. What the church and faith do give to those who claim them, however, is a sense 
of lineage, continuity, and cultural inheritance. Religion is a conduit of continuity and 
Orthodoxy, especially for those who claim it but do not live it, but often a marker of one’s 
Russianness. These four factors form a relationship of mutual reinforcement, which proves 
that religion, though perhaps not the centerpiece of minority identity, is an important 
contributor worth taking into account.   
 The mutual reinforcement of religion and ethnicity found in this specific case of 
Russian Orthodoxy in turn makes the avoidance of the political impossible. The ROC’s 
own political involvement spills over Russia’s borders. Its growing concerns for Ukraine’s 
potential effect on its international standings and its continuing competition with the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate keep Estonia’s EOC-MP in a position worthy of continued 
observation. A ROC in a precarious position could view its position in Estonia as even 
more invaluable for maintaining its relationship with the Kremlin. The visits of the ROC 
officials, ceremonies celebrating new churches, and Patriarch Kirill’s impassioned defense 
of the russky mir all speak to the fact that church and politics do indeed overlap.  
 This study sought to see how important religion was in the construction of minority 
identity and whether it aided or detracted from national integration aims. The case of 
Estonia shows that religion is an arena in which all major integration issues and conflicts of 
minority identity intersect, though in varying degrees. While Estonia does not lend as much 
significance to religion as in other countries, such as the United States or even Russia itself, 
the churches still have the potential to become greater hubs of gathering and community, 
especially in the absence or inaccessibility of others. Estonia would benefit from a 
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resolution of the property dispute that still lingers between the two Orthodox churches as 
this persistent conflict preserves the divide between them and encourages ethnic-based 
judgments from religious and non-religious alike.  This conflict is also a choice candidate 
to be used by divisive forces to their own advantage, an example in which Russians and 
their supporters could point to the Estonian state and the EAOC as prejudiced and pitted 
against this minority, regardless of the legality of their claims. A negotiated solution to this 
standoff has the potential to create greater stability, as well as mutual respect and trust, 
between Estonians and Russians, which would only positively impact the Estonian state to 
which they both belong. 
 Additionally, the research for this thesis took place during the escalation of Ukraine’s 
Maidan crisis and, later on, the referendum in Crimea, allowing me to see the potential 
importance of understanding Estonia’s specific case in relation to others. The world 
watched as Putin annexed a portion of another state’s territory, an unprecedented step in a 
post-World War II world. With its high population of Russian-speakers and adjacent 
borders, Estonia viewed the actions taken by Russia as a manifestation of the involvement 
that the Russian government had been verbally condoning for years through its compatriot 
policies. In Ukraine, Russia had taken the step toward action and securing its interests in a 
former region of dominance.  
 Many of the individuals interviewed for this study candidly voiced their concerns 
regarding these developments; some went so far as to say that they believed the same plan 
was intended for Estonia down the road, especially if the actions in Ukraine went 
unchecked by the greater international community. While Estonia enjoys the valuable 
protection that being a NATO member and European Union member-state affords, its 
concern is rooted in cultural resentments still harbored by its Russian minority. This image 
of close cooperation between Russian church and state is one that raises the suspicions of 
Estonians towards the EOC-MP in their own country.  
 Ukraine and Estonia also share a similar status in the eyes of Russia. As former 
republics of the Soviet Union, they remain within Russia’s perceived sphere of influence 
even to this day. Though Russia recognizes the independence of both the Estonian and 
Ukrainian states, both the ROC and the Russian Federation prove incapable of truly letting 
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these countries depart from their grasp, preferring to keep them in their orbit politically, 
economically, and culturally. According to Father J. Buciora, “It is puzzling to observe that 
the government of the Russian Federation indisputably recognizes the independence of 
Ukraine and Estonia, while the Moscow Patriarchate refuses even to consider the 
possibility of giving complete independence-autocephaly to the local Churches of those 
countries.”181 In fact, the Russian Union of Orthodox Citizens claim that the “boundaries of 
Rus extend as far as the boundaries of the Russian Orthodox Church,” a philosophy that 
lays claim to a territory that looks suspiciously like the former USSR and speaks to an 
imperialistic mentality.182 The Ecumenical Patriarchate is also a factor for competition 
within Ukrainian Orthodoxy, as in Estonia. When Patriarch Bartholomew visited Estonia in 
late October of 2000, much to the disapproval of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Jamestown 
Foundation was proposing the possibility of Estonia’s break with the Russian see as a 
motivator and confidence-builder for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate 
(UOC-KP). The more western-leaning of the Orthodox churches in Ukraine, the UOC-KP 
would give nod to Bartholomew’s leadership in this competition between the two 
patriarchates while also shutting off a valve of Russian influence into this large Ukrainian 
church.  
 In the events of EuroMaidan, annexation, and separatist fighting, Patriarch Kirill has 
faced the same difficulty in choosing where he falls on the spectrum of support for 
Ukraine’s conflict. Alexei Malashenko, a religion specialist at the Carnegie Moscow 
Center, remarked that “the Russian Orthodox Church risks gradually losing Ukraine if it 
just goes on repeating…the Kremlin line; it risks becoming only a national church of 
Russia. If Kirill loses out in Ukraine, he also becomes less attractive to the Kremlin.”183 
 As Russia tries to redraw the lines of Europe’s map, a shift in Orthodox alliances in 
Ukraine would undoubtedly redraw lines on the map of Orthodoxy in Europe as well. The 
loss of the ROC’s power in Ukraine could translate into a tighter grasp on the other 
Orthodox churches that they possess beyond their Russian borders. Moreover, a threatened 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Buciora, “Canonical Territory of the Moscow Patriarchate,” 8.  
182 Ibid, 3. 	  
183 Mark R. Elliott, “The Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis on Religious Life in Ukraine and Russia,” East-West 
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church may support decisions to throw more effort into propaganda-saturated media, 
cultural programs, and Russia-friendly political initiatives within Estonia in order to 
cultivate a stronger base of Russian support. As Orthodoxy remains a central component to 
watch in the unfolding of the Ukrainian conflict, it invites members of other local Orthodox 
churches throughout the region, both subordinated to the ROC and not, to think about how 
they consider themselves as Orthodox, especially as Russian-speaking Orthodox. Though 
the criticism of Russia’s actions is highly warranted, the effect that it has on Russian 
minorities abroad could push them closer to institutions that represent Russian identity in a 
culturally positive way. A primary example of this would be the Church. Just as Estonia 
calls upon the world to watch the events in Ukraine closely in fear that such attempts will 
be made against their borders, so too should the parallels between the Orthodox churches in 
Ukraine and Estonia be observed and evaluated moving forward.  
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Appendix I  
 
Interview Questions184 
 
 
 
1. Please state your name, profession/job title, and a little bit about what you do.  
 
2. Describe the religious environment in Estonia.  
 
3. Could you speak about your general perceptions of the Estonian Orthodox Church-
Moscow Patriarchate and the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church?  
 
4. What role does the Estonian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate play amongst 
the Russian minority?  
 
5. In your opinion, is the Russian Orthodox community centered more on 
national/cultural identity or Christian identity?  
 
6. In your opinion, has the Orthodox Church hindered or helped Russians’ integration 
into Estonian society?  
 
 
Interview transcripts are available upon request.  	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  The questions were general guidelines. In the interviews, each question may have been asked in a different 
order or worded slightly differently, depending on the direction that the interview was taking.  
